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1

INSPIRATION & RATIONALE
Why do people vote? It is a question that hundreds, maybe thousands, of

political scientist have tried to answer. Generally, scholarship in this area frames the
discussion in terms of extrinsic motivation and/or intrinsic motivation. Few scholars
make arguments that rely exclusively on either intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. Instead,
we try to untangle the complicated relationship between the stimuli people are exposed
to, how they think about these stimuli, and the actions they take as a result. Often
discussions of voting behavior start with the sources of political information as scholars
attempt to understand what information people are exposed to and who exposes them
to it. Scholarship has focused on several difference sources – family members, peers, or
the mass media.
Many early political socialization theorists developed the direct transmission
model to describe how people establish their political beliefs. The model suggests that
parents expose their children to their political attitudes and behaviors and their children
emulate them (Hess & Torney, 1967). Eventually, this simplistic approach was replaced
by a more nuanced understanding of how attitudes and behaviors are learned. Scholars
began looking more closely at the psychological and social functions that impact how
children accept and internalize the information they received from their parents (see
McDevitt and Chaffee 2002).
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While transmission within families has been studied for several decades, it is
only more recently that peer networks have received similar attention. Scholars
analyzing peer networks engage in debates similar to those studying family units.
According to McClurg (2003) social networks create “opportunities for individuals to
gather information about politics that allows them to live beyond personal resource
constraints, thereby supporting [their] political activity” (449). McClurg (2003) and
others argue that social network characteristics such as size, frequency of discussion,
and diversity can increase the amount of information people are exposed to and
therefore alter their political attitudes and behavior. These scholars often suggest that
large, diverse networks expose their members to more political information making
them more knowledgeable about politics and more likely to vote (Huckfeldt and
Sprague 1995; McClurg 2003). This approach is similar to the direct transmission model
discussed by political socialization scholars. However, Mutz (2002) shows that not all
network information is equal. If network diversity manifests as disagreement rather
than just increased content it could have a demobilizing effect. Mutz (2002) shows that
psychological factors interact with information exposure to influence behavioral
outcomes.
Much of the mass media literature also assumes a direct transmission model.
Several scholars argue that even subtle exposure to information impacts the saliency of
that information among the public and alters public opinion (Althaus 2003; Mutz 1998;
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Wanta 1997; Zaller 1992). Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argue that as the gatekeepers of
information, the mass media are able to shape the national agenda by deciding which
information to present to the public; thus, influencing which issues are most important
to voters. While the mass media certainly try to persuade how voters think about
certain issues (Fridkin et al. 2008), their ability to control what voters think about
ultimately has the greatest impact on public discourse according to Althaus (2003). That
said, other scholars have argued that the effect of the mass media is more indirect. For
instance, Shah et al. (2005) find that behavioral outcomes (i.e. voting) are shaped by
interpersonal discourse sparked by mass media rather than by the mass media directly.
Looking across previous work shows an unmistakable common element—our
understanding of turnout and voting behavior begins with the assumption that people
are exposed to information, become aware of that information, and it impacts how they
think or behave. This dissertation build on this previous research by considering how
social media affect politics. Interestingly, exposure to a Facebook post from a high
school friend is what gave me the idea to pursue the research in the following chapters.
It was the fall of 2008; the presidential general election was underway and for the first
time in almost a decade I wasn’t actively working on a political campaign. I volunteered
a few days a week at the local campaign office, but I used Facebook to offset my
nostalgia for political organizing. Most of my posts encouraged readers to register to
vote, find their polling place, or volunteer for and/or donate to the candidate I was
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supporting. Occasionally, I’d post commentary regarding a news story, but I generally
appealed to my “friends” for their time, money, and vote.
As Election Day neared, I received a private Facebook message from a high
school friend, Sarah.1 While I had kept up with Sarah’s major life events via Facebook,
we hadn’t actually talked in eight years. My memory of the 18 year-old version of Sarah
was a pretty and outgoing girl, who, like most of my peers, was politically apathetic.
Nothing in Sarah’s Facebook activity indicated her political interest or involvement had
changed since high school. Yet, in mid-October 2008 I received a message titled, “Hey.”
In the text, Sarah tells me she’s seen my posts about the campaign and decided to
volunteer. I remember thinking something like, “That’s cool,” and closing the message
without much further thought. Obviously, being a political organizer, I was expecting
my post would cause Sarah’s reaction or else I wouldn’t have posted the appeals. It
wasn’t until I became an academic that I realized the significance of the exchange.
Early in my political career I worked as a field organizer for political campaigns
and eventually as the National Communications Director for Youth Vote Coalition, the
nonprofit youth civic organization associated with Gerber and Green’s (2001) work
evaluating door-to-door canvassing among young people and Nickerson’s (2007b)
experiment testing the effectiveness of emailed mobilization messages. As a political
field organizer I relied on my instincts to win campaigns, but publicizing the work done

1

Name has been changed to protect the person’s identity.
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by Gerber, Green, and Nickerson showed me the value of testing what my instincts told
me to do. Graduate school forced me to remember this lesson, and I began to reconsider
Sarah’s message. I quickly decided that it was time to scientifically evaluate my
assumptions about being able to mobilize my friends using Facebook.
While social media is becoming an increasingly popular form of peer-to-peer
communication, most scholarship evaluating the use of these sites in politics assumes it
is a channel of unidirectional mass communication exploited by political elites to
manipulate the public agenda (see Williams and Gulati 2007; Utz 2009; Johnson and
Perlmutter 2010; Robertson, Vatrapu, and Medina 2010; Towner and Dulio 2011).
Research on email, blogging, and online mobilization offer some assessment of
computer-mediated, peer-to-peer political communication; however, this research still
focuses on how citizens use technology to communicate with opinion leaders and other
users who are not members of their traditional, offline social network (Bimber 1998;
Conners 2005; Juris 2005; Klotz 2004; Krueger 2006; Nickerson 2007b). Even research
that examines the relationship between online communication and offline behavior
focuses almost exclusively on how users convert online communication into offline
activism through boycotts, buycotts, rallies, and petitions (Conners 2005; Juris 2005;
Loader 2008). Ultimately, there is little research that examines the role of interpersonal
computer-mediated communication that parallels the existing offline interpersonal
communication with regards to winning elections.
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Social network sites allow users to communicate with a large group of people,
just like the mass media, while preserving (and some argue building) the connectedness
afforded by interpersonal communication methods. Instead of contacting each person
individually to facilitate interpersonal communication, SNSs allow users to connect
with their family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and even acquaintances by publicly
posting information that they would otherwise share through traditional interpersonal
channels with just a few people.
Additionally, SNSs provide opportunities for active and passive information
exchanges. Users are able to actively engage each other in direct conversations while
everyone in their individual networks passively observe. According to Brandtzæga,
Lüdersa, Skjetne (2010) social surveillance, the semi-public exchange of information,
allows users to form bonds with each other by providing opportunities for actively
engaging each other in discussion. Brandtzæga, Lüdersa, Skjetne (2010) find that the
passive observation of self-disclosed information serves to enhance the social bonds of
non-discussants. Just by being able to observe each other’s information and behavior,
SNSs allow users to feel more connected to each other (Cummings, Butler, and Kraut
2002; Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007; Golder, Wilkinson, and Huberman 2007;
Subramani and Rajagopalan 2003).
Information sharing is the key component to creating and sustaining successful
computer-mediated relationships (Merkle and Richardson 2000); however, before SNSs,
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mass information sharing was difficult to organize within a social network and often
viewed as inappropriate for computer-mediated communication channels. While email
has the capacity to facilitate such mass communication within an entire social network,
it is guided by social norms that make it as ineffective as face-to-face and telephone
communication for mass information sharing. Unlike information sharing that occurs
by the mass media, discussants who engage in information sharing through face-toface, telephone, or email are involved in a social transaction and expect that the
information being conveyed to them is somehow personally relevant (Walther 1995).
Social networking sites have reduced this relevancy condition by relying on mass
information sharing to facilitate social interactions. For example, most people do not
visit, call, or email everyone they know to tell them that they are undecided about
whom to vote for because they might think that the people they know would not be
interested in such information. However, disclosing such information on a SNS
provides users a non-invasive way to interact with their network; thus, increasing the
frequency of their interactions and sustaining their social bond. Instead of taking the
time to call each person in their network individually, users are able to share their
thoughts with their entire network and learn what their entire network is thinking
about just by logging into a SNS.
The most widely used SNS platform currently is facebook.com (Facebook).
Although their mission has evolved, Facebook formerly stated that it, “helps you
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connect and share with the people in your life” (Facebook 2009). As a result, Facebook
explicitly focused on developing policies and social norms that encouraged users to
construct their offline social networks virtually. A further benefit of SNSs is their ability
to enhance weak-ties (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007). Returning to the
hypothetical example of a user who is undecided about which candidate to vote for,
perhaps one of the user’s acquaintances knows something about the candidates that
could help the user decide, or maybe the user’s acquaintance supports a particular
candidate and wants to attempt to persuade the user; thus, an exchange of information
occurs. Such information sharing is unlikely to occur by traditional communication
channels among casual acquaintances, but the relaxed social norms and information
sharing expectations allow SNS users to interact more informally (Fogg 2008),
providing more opportunities for information transfers to occur (Fogg and Eckles 2007).
Moreover, computer-mediated communication has been shown to facilitate trustbuilding between users. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) conduct an experiment in
which participants playing prisoner dilemma games are assigned to communicate via
email, face-to-face, or not at all. Those communicating via email exhibited greater levels
of cooperation and trust than those communicating face-to-face or not at all. This
finding indicates that social media may allow users to establish trust in relationships
faster than offline communication.
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Druckman (2001) find that trust is critical in shaping political attitudes.
Druckman (2001) argues that people are better able to accept and retain information
from trusted sources. Social network scholars have shown that people in large, diverse
networks have greater political knowledge vote at higher rates than people with
smaller, insular networks that are less knowledgeable (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987,
1995; Kenny 1992).
Given that the purpose of SNSs is to provide a more efficient way for users to
build trust relationships and exchange information, I expect SNSs could be an
invaluable tool for political organizers. Users are able to manage larger social networks
and interact with them more often; providing opportunities for greater exposure to
information and increased trust between weak ties. I posit that whether from
information exposure, increased trust, or a combination of these factors, SNSs have the
potential to be an effective tool for political organizing that can increase political
knowledge, change political attitudes, and activate civic behavior.
Virtually no academic research measures how SNSs can be leveraged as a
political organizing tool. Instead much of the politically focused research addressing
SNSs focuses on privacy (Boyd and Ellison 2007), self-disclosure and personal
presentation (Boyd and Ellison 2007; Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007; Gaines and
Mondak 2009), patterns of use (see Vitak et al. 2011) and the impact they have on social
capital (Boyd and Ellison 2007; Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007; Pasek, More, and
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Romer 2009). As peer-to-peer communication extends beyond face-to-face and
telephone conversations to include SNSs, it is imperative to test how these
supplemental social interactions can influence civic engagement.
Since the literature regarding SNSs as a political organizing tool is so limited, I have
chosen to base the theoretical arguments for this essay in the literatures applicable to
offline learning, opinion formation, and behavioral changes. Specifically, I review
literature that highlights activities capitalizing on peer-to-peer communication such as
door-to-door canvassing (Gerber and Green 2000, 2001, 2005; Green, Gerber, and
Nickerson 2003; Nickerson 2006b; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; Sinclair,
McConnell, and Michelson 2007) and phone banking (Gerber and Green 2001,
Nickerson 2006a, 2007a; Nickerson Friedrichs, and King 2006) since these are the most
effective offline mobilization methods for increasing civic participation.
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2

2009 POLITICAL LEARNING QUASI-LAB EXPERIMENT
To begin an evaluation of social network sites (SNSs) as a channel for political

communication I must first assess the extent to which political information can be
learned through these types of sites. The majority of studies evaluating how effective
the SNSs are for facilitating learning are quite limited and bleak. Boyd (2008) argues
that SNS aid disinterested voters in further disengaging from politics by allowing them
to define a small, homogenous network that limits exposure to diverse information.
Baumgartner and Morris (2010), build on this by attempting to connect SNS use with
limited political knowledge. The authors assess how well people who indicate that they
get their news from SNS can identify which 2008 presidential primary candidate fit a
“description that had been widely discussed in the media” (33). Their results indicate
that, “there is little evidence to suggest that individuals who get their news about
politics on SN Web sites are well informed” (34).
Scholars who study the Internet as a social medium consistently argue that the
medium allows users to insulate themselves from others who might have different
opinions and interest than them (Kraut et al. 1998; Nie 2001). These scholars argue that
users engage in selection bias by only building relationships with those who are most
like them. However, given that the leading SNS, Facebook, reports that the average user
has 130 “friends” (Facebook 2012), it is increasingly difficult to blame network
homogeneity for low levels of political knowledge. Moreover, the limited SNS studies
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evaluating the political knowledge of SNS users fail to test whether this is due to a lack
of content or a function of the medium.
Why is this distinction important? Simply put, one has more obvious policy
implications than the other. If SNSs are failing to increase political knowledge because
users’ networks are too small and homogenous to produce valuable content, there is
little that can be done to encourage people to develop more diverse online social
networks. However, if the problem is not network size, but rather limited exposure, it is
possible to encourage SNSs to do a better job of providing users with more diverse
information from their online social network.
2.1 WHAT IS LEARNING
There are three main theories of learning: behaviorism, cognitivism, and
constructivism. Each of these theories identifies exposure to some stimulus as the initial
catalyst for learning to occur. Behaviorism asserts that learning is the acquisition of new
behavior through conditioning—or repeated exposure (B.F. Skinner 1974). Cognitivism,
including information processing theories, suggests that learning is the act of storing
away the things that one is exposed to until they are needed (Bode 1929). And,
constructivism proposes that learning is based on putting something one has been
exposed to into context immediately (Piaget 1952).
The three main learning theories apply to all types of knowledge, including the
declarative knowledge—hard facts—needed to participate in democracy. Therefore, the
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basic thesis, that being exposed to information should increases one’s awareness of that
information is a minimum requirement for being able to measure whether political
information can be learned from SNSs. However, behaviorism, cognitivism, and
constructivism all assert that being aware of information is only part the first part of
learning.
In addition to being aware of information, each of the theories outlined above
state that one must be able to recall the information for it to be considered successful
learning. Therefore, all of these theories assume the most basic definition of learning as
the ability to recall information after exposure. A common approach scholars use to
quantify learning is to measure awareness in terms of saliency and label any observed
increases in saliency as “learning” when it occurs after exposure (Miller and Mackuen
1979; Zukin and Snyder 1984; Chaffee and Frank 1996; Barabas 2008).
2.2 BENEFITS OF SOCIAL NETWORK SITES FOR INFORMATION EXPOSURE
Since at least the mid-twentieth century, scholars have argued that social
networks play a vital role in political life (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). The
political networks literature indicates that engaging with one’s social network increases
political knowledge (Eveland and Hively 2009), the probability of voting (McClurg
2003; Fowler 2005; Nickerson 2008), and the probability of voting correctly (Sokhey and
McClurg 2008; Richey 2008). While the political networks literature attempts to focus on
how engaging in discussion facilitates learning, I content that this literature is build on
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the foundation of the exposure thesis. For example, McClurg (2003) writes that social
interactions are a significant source of political information because they provide
“opportunities for individuals to gather information about politics that allows them to
live beyond personal resource constraints, thereby supporting [their] political activity”
(449).
Although the political networks literature presents itself as a relying on social or
relationship-based theories for why social network discussion should be a predictor of
greater political knowledge, analysis largely fails to include measures that speak to the
specific mechanism that promote learning. Relevance, credibility, and other network
features may matter a great deal; however, an even simpler explanation may be simply
that exposure to information increases knowledge, regardless of any source effects.
Therefore, regardless of any tie-strength component, social networks are, at a minimum,
an information resource that increases exposure to information. Hence, I posit that
simply based on their ability to expose users to a greater quantity of content, SNSs are
exceptionally well-equipped to facilitate learning generally, which would include
political learning.
At a minimum, SNSs have empowered users to increase the number of people
with whom they communicate with and receive information from on a daily basis.
Instead of contacting a handful of members from their social network individually,
SNSs allow users to connect with everyone—their family, friends, coworkers, and even
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minor acquaintances—by publicly posting information that they might otherwise share
with only a few of these people through traditional interpersonal communication
channels. As of January 2012, the SNS, Facebook, claimed that its average user had
approximately 130 “friends,” or individuals they could communicate with by simply
typing a message and clicking the “Share” button (Facebook 2012). It is important to
note that 80 percent of Facebook’s users live outside the United States; therefore, the
average Facebook user, by definition, is not American.
Based on its user statistics, Facebook claims that as of December 2011
approximately 161 million of its monthly users live within the United States (Constine
2012). When combined with the most recent U.S. census, conducted in 2010,
approximately three out of every five Americans eligible to have a Facebook account are
using the site at least monthly. 2 This means that although the average Facebook user has
130 friends, the average American user probably has many more “friends” since so
many of us are active on the site each month.
As noted earlier, the typical political networks study argues that network size is
a predictor of political knowledge. These scholars find that larger discussion networks
expose respondents to more information and make them more knowledgeable about
politics. However, name generator data, which generally allows a respondent to
disclose only up to four people with whom they discuss politics, is used for this
2

See Table 2 at. http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf for specific census counts
by age.
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analysis. Scholars rely on the fact that respondents find it difficult to identify four
people with whom they discuss politics to provide the variation necessary for this type
of analysis. Therefore, the largest networks identified by name generator methods
contain just four people with whom the respondent discusses politics when using name
generator data. Note that name generator analysis does not distinguish between the
respondent being exposed to information and the respondent exposing others to
information. Therefore, some respondents are considered knowledgeable, not because
they have more instances of exposure to information as the political networks literature
outlined earlier argues, but rather because they expose a large number of others to
information. That said, if we ignore that some respondents evaluated by name
generator studies are considered knowledgeable because they share the information
they already have and apply the argument as it is made by political network scholars, it
is illogical to think that a SNS user, with a network of at least 130 people would not
exhibit at least some political learning.
2.3 POTENTIAL LIMITS OF SOCIAL NETWORK SITES
Although SNSs allow users to receive information from more people within their
networks, it is possible that such exposure has either no effect or maybe even a negative
effect. Having such large networks inevitably means that the information users are
exposed to is much more diverse than what they receive from just their smaller offline
interpersonal networks. A recent study released from Facebook states, “Even though a
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person is more likely to share a single piece of information from one of their close
contacts, it turns out that weak ties, as defined by Grannovetter (1973), are collectively
responsible for the majority of information spread” (Bakshy 2012). Facebook indicates
that this is a positive development; however, the content they refer to is not specifically
politically motivated. Work by Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) and Nyhan and Reifler
(2010) provide various instances in which exposure to information that is inconsistent
with one’s current preferences can have harmful consequences.
However, even if SNSs are not actively contributing to the misinformation of
their users it is possible that the sheer amount of information they are exposed to is too
overwhelming to facilitate successful learning. Zhou et al. (2009) state that “when the
number of weak ties is too large, individuals are likely to experience information overload: They may be unable to sort through the voluminous, discordant information. Too
many divergent perspectives may be cognitively taxing to the point of confusion”
(1545).
Facebook’s study of diversity among their users’ networks finds that there is
“increased flow of information across strong ties,” meaning that users are more
interested in being exposed to and sharing information from their strongest ties (Bakshy
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2012).3 Moreover, SNSs such as Facebook have used this information to justify their use
of algorithms that discreetly engage in such selection bias on behalf of the user,
presenting them with information that they believe is most relevant to the user. Pariser
(2011) calls this “the filter bubble.”
Instead of editorial gatekeepers as described by Iyengar and Kinder (1987),
Pariser (2011) details how algorithms now serve as information gatekeepers. They filter
which information users are exposed to based on which information they have been
most responsive to in the past. However, unlike traditional gatekeepers, algorithms
cannot judge the importance of information. Therefore, SNSs using algorithmic filters to
evaluate users’ past behavior in an effort to expose them to the most relevant
information in the future may not actually expose users to any more information than
they would receive from their traditional, offline social network. Although it is
important to realize that algorithms are effecting users’ experiences, the question
remains whether SNSs are able to facilitate political learning despite these challenges.
2.4 DESIGN
To evaluate the effectiveness of SNS for transferring political knowledge, I
designed an experiment with two conditions that delivers three categories of
information through a SNS and evaluates participants’ knowledge about that
3

Facebook measures tie strength between two individuals as “the number of comments a person
received from their friend on Facebook. Other measurements of tie strength, like the number of
messages, co-appearances in photos, and discussion on posts.” Their complete methodology can be
found at https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-team/rethinking-information-diversity-innetworks/10150503499618859
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information through a subsequent survey. I recruited students from eight sections of an
introductory political science course. Potential participants received instructions for
enrolling in the experiment that randomly assigned them to friend either “Tiffany
Roper” or “Courtney Harris” on Facebook.4 Participants were told that the profile they
were assigned to “friend” belonged to an actual female, Caucasian, Georgia State
University sophomore who volunteered for my project. Indicating that the personas
attend the same university and had a desire to participate in the experiment provided
the stimulus necessary to initiate the bonding process between participants and their
assigned persona. The use for two profiles was explained to students as an effort to
keep from overwhelming either of my “volunteers.” Students were told that I sought to
observe how social media networks grow and interact. Nothing communicated to
students during the recruitment process indicated my interest in their political
knowledge, nor were participants told about the subsequent survey ath the time of
recruitment or enrollment.
Ensuring participants are actually exposed to stimuli is difficult through the
Facebook platform. At the time of the experiment, exposure to specific “Status Updates”
4

Two profiles were necessary, because at the time of the experiment a user could not filter which of
their “friends” had access to specific “Status Updates;” therefore, a single profile could not
administer treatments and withhold them from the control condition. The feature that provides the
functionality was introduced in December 2009. See “Adding Controls for Each Post” at
https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=196629387130 for further information about this function.
In addition, participants were not allowed to “friend” both profiles. When participants attempted to
friend both profiles at the time of enrollment I randomly selected which request to accept and
ignored the other request. When participants attempted to friend the second profile after their friend
request to the first profile had been accepted their second request was ignored.
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via their News Feed was dependent on the user’s number of “friends” and personal
settings.5 This means that some participants may need to seek out their assigned
persona’s profile page in order to be exposed to the stimuli. Additionally, users may
“hide” or opt-out of being presented with information from a specific “friend;”
however, just four percent of my sample reported taking this action. While the inability
to strictly control exposure to stimuli is undesirable for an experiment, those being
sheltered from or opting-out of receiving information should be randomized across the
treatment conditions preventing any systemic selection bias. Furthermore, such limits to
exposure make it more difficult to detect any treatment effects.
Nevertheless, I discouraged participants from sheltering themselves from the
stimuli by posting two extra credit exam questions during the semester through the
experiment profiles.6 While this incentive slightly increases the burden on participants
by asking them to monitor their assigned persona’s profile page, such a behavior is
consistent with typical Facebook usage. Students unable or unwilling to “friend” me
through Facebook could send me an email to receive these two questions.

5

6

Users can control the information presented to them by: setting a cap on the number of friends
included in their News Feed or “hiding” specific friends to prevent all stories from that particular
user/friend from appearing in their News Feed. Additionally, the News Feed is populated by an
“algorithm [that decides which information to present to the user] based on a few factors: how many
friends are commenting on a certain piece of content, who posted the content, and what type of
content it is (e.g. photo, video, or Status Update).” These were the guidelines governing information
presentation when the experiment was administered. For the most recent guidelines see
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=16162.
Students not wanting to participate in the study were able to request that the questions be emailed to
them.
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For external validity purposes, participants were provided with as authentic a
Facebook experience as possible. The public aspects of each persona’s Facebook profile
were personalized with a unique name and profile picture; however, all of the other
characteristics of each profile such as the girls’ general physical appearance, personal
information, and additional photos remained constant. Additionally, I invited people
from my personal Facebook network who had no existing relationship with the
participants to “friend” each persona in an effort to make them appear more authentic.
To further facilitate a peer relationship between participants and their assigned persona,
I exposed both conditions to identical self-disclosure stimuli, no more than once per
day, during the duration of the experiment. These stimuli provided information
unrelated to the treatments and encouraged conversation. In addition, acting as their
assigned persona, I posted comments and utilized the “like” function7 to facilitate social
bonding with participants. While researcher-initiated contact was identical across the
conditions, participant comments and my responses to those comments were unique to
each condition and were not equivalent in content or quantity across the conditions.
Ultimately, none of the participants gave any indication that they doubted the validity
of either persona.
In addition to the self-disclosure stimuli, Tiffany Roper posted one political
stimulus regarding the November 3, 2009 Atlanta mayoral race per day, and Courtney
7

The “like” function on Facebook offers users an automated way to indicate their support or
agreement with another user’s message without writing a personalized comment to that user.
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Harris posted one placebo stimulus regarding entertainment or sports news per day.
Additionally, both Tiffany and Courtney occasionally posted a supplemental stimulus;
an identical entertainment or sports story distinct from anything posted to the placebo
treatment condition. The point of the supplemental stimuli was to increase the validity
of the political treatment persona since most people post a variety of information and
not just political information. Each condition received one unique stimulus (either
political or placebo) and no more than two identical stimuli (either self-disclosure
and/or supplemental) each day for the seven days of the experiment (see Table 1). All of
the political and placebo stimuli were chosen to be timely and obtained from the
headlines of major news outlet websites including The Atlanta Journal Constitution,
Yahoo! News, ESPN, and TMZ. Additionally, the day and order in which I posted
information were randomized. However, randomization was sometimes constrained by
the topic of the stimulus. For example, a stimulus informing participants about the
outcome of a sporting event could not be administered before the game was played.
Therefore, these posts were randomized based on the possible days they could appear.
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Table 1. Knowledge Experiment Stimuli Protocol
Political
Treatment

Entertainment
Treatment

is trying to decide what to be for Halloween. Any suggestions?

Conversational

Conversational

Golf as an Olympic sport in 2016? Seriously? Maybe I'll be a
Golf Olympian for Halloween :)
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5joBrBs
5y2U-RSVx-GkuhArYhQWNQ

Supplemental

Supplemental

Undecided Men Could Swing Atlanta Mayoral Election?
http://www.11alive.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=136007
&catid=3

Political

--

Rapper T.I. Arrested in Atlanta… I totally forgot about this!
http://www.tmz.com/2007/10/13/rapper-t-i-arrested-in-atlanta/

--

Entertainment

Conversational

Conversational

Political

--

Jay-Z to perform before game two of the World Series tonight
between the Phillies and Yankees!
http://backporch.fanhouse.com/2009/10/29/jay-z-to-performbefore-yankees-game-is-bigger-than-new-york/

--

Entertainment

I heard Ryan Seacrest talking about Ellen DeGeneres, the new
American Idol judge, while I was volunteering at the Atlanta
Ronald McDonald House – here’s the footage to prove it!
http://blogs.ajc.com/american-idol-blog/2009/10/25/ryanseacrest-interview-at-ronald-mcdonald-house-in-atlanta/

Supplemental

Supplemental

Political

--

--

Entertainment

Conversational

Conversational

Day 1 – October 28, 2009

Day 2 – October 29, 2009
had a really strange dream last night about being locked in
Aderhold! Really, are there any worse places to be locked in!?!
The League of Women Voters of Georgia has put together a
Voter Guide. Use it to get info about elections in your area!
http://www.thevoterguide.org/a-ajc09/

Day 3 – October 30, 2009
Does anyone know why there would be a run-off for Atlanta
mayor unless one candidate gets at least 50% of the vote? Why
doesn’t the person who gets the most votes win, geesh!
is predicting UGA will get crushed by the Florida Gators
tomorrow… sorry Bulldog fans.
Day 4 – October 31, 2009
Happy Halloween! Candy coma here I come!
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Professors from Clark Atlanta University wrote a memo saying
blacks need to “band together today to elect a black mayor” in
Atlanta. Do you think it was ok for them to get involved?
http://features.csmonitor.com/politics/2009/09/01/was-atlantasblack-mayor-first-memo-racist-or-just-blunt/

Political

--

Every time I see a commercial for “Survivor Samoa” I think of
the Girl Scout cookie! What’s your favorite Girl Scout cookie?

--

Entertainment

Either give Michael Vick the QB job or don't, but letting the
former Atlanta Falcon ride the bench in Philly to help him save
a few of his endorsement deals isn't actually letting him back
into the NFL.
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/sports20091024_Eagles_using_
Vick_sparingly.html

Supplemental

Supplemental

Mayoral Hopefuls Lisa Borders, Mary Norwood, and Kasim
Reed All Try Using Facebook to Persuade and Organize
Voters!
http://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta/mayoral-hopefuls-try-social168753.html

Political

--

Heidi Klum’s been married for 4 years and she’s just changing
her name, at this point why bother!?!

--

Entertainment

Political

--

--

Entertainment

While trying to study today I realize I have horrible
handwriting… does anyone like their handwriting?

Conversational

Conversational

Falcons lose to the Saints... finally (I thought that game would
never end)!

Supplemental

Supplemental

Political

--

--

Entertainment

Conversational

Conversational

Day 5 – November 1, 2009

Day 6 – November 2, 2009
says the Atlanta mayoral election is tomorrow... make sure you
vote! Find your polling place at
http://www.vote411.org/pollfinder.php
Florida is still ranked #1 in the BCS rankings... big freakin
surprise

Day 7 – November 3, 2009
The polls are open form 7AM - 7PM today. Go Vote!
Louie Vito (the snowboarder) was eliminated from Dancing
with the Stars last Tuesday. Who do you think will go home
tonight?
If you could have a $10,000 shopping spree to one store, which
store would it be and how long would it take you to spend the
$10,000?
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Within six days of exposure to the final stimulus participants were given class
time to complete a survey (see Appendix A) that evaluated how much of the stimuli
provided they could recall. Assessments of their platform usage, an evaluation of the
bond formed with their assigned persona, their level of interest in politics, voting
behavior, political preferences, political socialization, and local media consumption
were also collected, in addition to their full name and basic demographic information.
Completed surveys were crosschecked against a list of participants enrolled in
each condition using the respondent’s full name. After matching a respondent to a
condition (political or placebo) the responses were aggregated within their condition for
analysis.
2.5 HYPOTHESES
Subjects who are exposed to information should correctly answer more questions
about that information than those who are not exposed to that information. Therefore:
H1

Subjects exposed to the political stimuli should correctly answer more questions
referencing the political stimuli than subjects not exposed to the political stimuli.

H2

Subjects exposed to the placebo stimuli should correctly answer more questions
referencing the placebo stimuli than subjects not exposed to the placebo stimuli.

2.6 DATA & ANALYSIS
A total of 735 students were enrolled in the classes that comprise my sample, but
just 170 of them chose to participate in the experiment by “friending” their assigned
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persona on Facebook, and just 115 of these participants completed the subsequent
survey (45 political, 70 placebo; see Table 2 for randomization check). All participants
must report having access to the Internet, have an active Facebook account, and be at
least 18 years old to be evaluated in this analysis. While Facebook users are not
representative of the public at-large, 92 percent of my survey respondents reported
having a Facebook account. Using a relatively homogeneous sample of university
students who all have similar access and familiarity to Facebook minimizes the
demographic variance in the sample and ensures that participants have relatively
similar SNS usage behavior. By randomly assigning participants to treatment and
control conditions, any participation selection bias, demographic skews, or other
systematic errors associated with studying a convenience sample of college students are
minimized.
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Table 2. Knowledge Experiment Randomization Check
Political
Treatment

Placebo
Treatment

100%

100%

251-300

251-300

Mean Usage Per Week (days)

5.84

5.65

Mean Number of Times Logged-In Per Day

4.07

4.64

Mean Usage Per Week (hours)

8.89

10.0

Mean Number of Days a Post of Any Kind was
Recalled*

2.17

1.05

Somewhat
Interested

Somewhat
Interested

Percent Male

12%

15%

Percent White

39%

38%

Mean Age*

21.55

19.38

Percent Democrat

63%

46%

Percent Resident of Atlanta

66%

73%

Slightly Interested

Slightly Interested

Somewhat
Interested

Somewhat
Interested

Occasionally
Talked About
Politics

Occasionally
Talked About
Politics

Mean Number of Days of Political Discussion

2.82

2.86

Mean Number of Days of Local Media Consumption

2.28

2.65

Mean Relationship Rating

0.95

0.62

Mean Attractiveness of the Political Treatment Personal

6.89

6.47

mean attractiveness of the entertainment treatment
personal

6.50

6.94

Facebook Statistics
Percent Having a Profile
Average Number of Facebook Friends
(mean category chosen by user)

Mean Political Interest of Facebook Network
Demographics

Political Interest
Average Interest in the Atlanta Mayoral Election
(mean category chosen by user)
Average Interest in Politics
(mean category chosen by user)
Average Political Socialization
(mean category chosen by user)

Relationship

* p<0.05; two-tailed test.
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Measurement: The survey asked 18 questions that tested participants’ ability to recall
information provided by the 18 non-self-disclosure stimuli (see Table 1 for stimulus
protocol). I created a political knowledge index by giving participants one point for
each question they answered correctly that corresponded to the political stimuli. I used
the same aggregation process to create indexes that assessed participants’ knowledge of
the placebo and supplemental information.
Analysis: I run separate bivariate ordered logit regression models for the
dependent variables “Political Knowledge Index” and “Placebo Knowledge Index.” The
only independent variable included in each of these models is Exposure to Information
(either political or placebo depending on condition assignment). Respondents exposed
to the information included in the index are coded one and zero for all others.
Therefore, placebo condition serves as the reference group in the “Political Knowledge
Index” model and the political condition serves as the reference group in the “Placebo
Knowledge Index” model.
2.7 RESULTS
The bivariate ordered logit regression models presented in Table 3 show the
effects of exposure to stimuli on the knowledge of that information. The first model
confirms hypothesis one: exposure to political stimuli through a SNS causes users to be
significantly more knowledgeable about the political information presented. However,
second model shows that exposure to the placebo stimuli through a SNS does not
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predict greater knowledge of that information. The “Placebo Knowledge Index” model
in Table 3 indicates that users exposed to the placebo stimuli are no more
knowledgeable about the information presented than those not exposed to that stimuli.
Therefore, the null cannot be rejected for hypothesis two. Given that political
information (especially about a mayoral election) is generally less salient than
entertainment information it is unclear if these results indicate that SNS are particularly
effective at transmitting political information or just any type of low saliency
information.
Table 3. Bivariate Ordered Logit: Knowledge Assessments
Political
Placebo
Knowledge
Knowledge
Index
Index
Exposure to Information

0.68*
(0.35)

[see column header for variable]

N
X2
p-value

115
X (1) = 3.82
p = 0.0505
2

0.18
(0.36)
115
X (1) = 0.26
p = 0.6084
2

*p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

Table 4 presents the cumulative treatment effects for each knowledge category.
When evaluating the “Political Knowledge Index” model presented in Table 3, I
discover an average treatment effect of 6.4 percentage points. This means that the
percentage of participants answering each question threshold correctly increases by an
average of 6.4 percentage points when participants are exposed to the political stimuli.
However, an average treatment effect is not particularly informative since the number
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of people answering each question is skewed towards those being able to answer one
question correctly instead of no questions correctly. Instead, it is more useful to look at
specific thresholds. For example, more than two-thirds of participants exposed to the
political stimuli (68.6%) correctly answer at least one of the six questions that comprise
the political knowledge index compared to just over half of participants exposed to the
placebo stimuli (52.7%) – this is a treatment effect of 16 percentage points (see Table 4).
Moreover, significant treatment effects are detected among participants at the most
knowledgeable levels as well. The percentage of participants answering three and four
questions correctly is significantly more for those exposed to the political stimuli than
the placebo stimuli. If the most knowledgeable people were unaffected by exposure to
the political treatment, the percentage of participants answering three and four
questions correctly would be similar. Instead, I find that the percentage of participants
exposed to the political stimuli answering three and for questions correctly is
significantly greater than those exposed to the placebo stimuli. Participants exposed to
the political stimuli are nearly twice as likely as their placebo counterparts to answer at
least four questions correctly.
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Table 4. Knowledge Experiment Treatment Effects
Number of Political
Knowledge Questions
Treatment
Correctly Answered
% Placebo % Political
Effect
At least 1

52.7

68.6

16.0%*

At least 2

25.4

40.0

14.7%

At least 3

14.9

25.6

10.7%*

At least 4

3.9

7.3

3.5%*

At least 5

0.0

0.0

0.0%

At least 6

0.0

0.0

0.0%

N=115

Avg. 6.4%

*p<0.1

2.8 DISCUSSION
Participants in this study report logging into their social networking account
three times as many days per week as they watch a local news program, and twice as
many days per week as they discuss politics with friends or family. Given the greater
usage of SNSs over traditional media and interpersonal communication by participants
in this study, it is encouraging to find that SNSs can facilitate at least some political
learning. The results from this study indicate that political information can be
significantly increased through SNSs; however, participants were exposed to relatively
few stimuli over a short period, from a “person” with whom they had no offline
relationship. Given the literature regarding how users cope with information overload
on SNSs, any of these factors individually could be used to explain null findings and the
fact that this particular experiment suffered from all of these limitations and still
detected significant results makes it reasonable to theorize that increasing any of these
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factors might produce even greater effects. That said, further investigation is needed to
understand how the treatment effects observed in this study compare to other methods
of communication.
Moreover, the stimuli provided in this experiment were nonpartisan and
generally noncontroversial. It is possible that a participant disagreed or did not believe
the information I presented; however, given the utilitarian nature of most of the stimuli
presented to participants, it is unlikely they had any existing perceptions that exposure
to my stimuli might have challenged. That said, further investigation is necessary to
understand how users react with the information they receive that is inconsistent with
their own beliefs.
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3

2010 MOBILIZATION FIELD EXPERIMENT
Academic research to date regarding mobilization efforts has arrived at two key

findings—(1) traditional campaign activities that capitalize on interpersonal exchanges,
such as door-to-door canvassing and phone banking, are extremely effective but time
consuming and costly; and (2) computer-mediated campaign activities that are more
impersonal, such as e-mail and candidate websites, increase the quantity of contacts and
are less expensive but are mostly ineffective (Bimber and Davis 2003; Green and Gerber
2000; Nickerson 2006b, 2008). The prior chapter highlights how difficult it is to change
people’s opinions via SNSs, especially if they are already even mildly interested in
politics. Therefore, it may not be feasible to implement a persuasion campaign via SNSs,
but this doesn’t mean that SNS users are completely resistant to all the political content
they are exposed to on SNSs. In fact, the data from the political knowledge chapter of
this essay indicate that users are receptive to nonpartisan, noncontroversial political
content. Perhaps SNS users will be receptive to traditional mobilization messages.
3.1 TURNOUT
For at least the past 90 years, scholars have been attempting to understand what
motivates people to vote. Research of this question has focused on traditional campaign
efforts such as canvassing (Gosnell 1927) and advertising (Holbrook and McClurg
2005), social networks (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee 1954; Niemi 1974; Kenny 1992), intrinsic motivation (Downs 1957), cognitive
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factors (Campbell et. al 1960; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000), demographic factors (Verba
and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), and many more. While early research
showed that interpersonal efforts were effective for driving participation, it was not
until the end of the twentieth century that scholars attempted to unpack the
relationship between interpersonal contact and traditional mobilization efforts.
In 1993, Rosenstone and Hansen theorize that, “Working through social
networks, candidates, parties, interest groups, and social movements exploit friendship
and social obligations” to achieve electoral sucess (210). A deeper examination of
interpersonal mobilization efforts followed (see Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson
2007). From this work we know that the importance of interpersonal interaction is
unlikely to be overstated when discussing effective mobilization tactics. Several studies
look at the effect of impersonal mobilization efforts such as email and text messages,
but all of these find marginal effects much smaller than face-to-face contact (Nickerson
2007b; Dale and Strauss 2009). Therefore, Dale and Strauss (2009) are correct when they
declare that, “connectedness is not a necessary condition for a successful mobilization
campaign” (787); however, there is overwhelming evidence that campaigns that
incorporate even the most superficial connectedness (i.e. stranger-to-stranger contact)
are more effective than campaigns that avoid interpersonal exchanges (Gerber and
Green 2000; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003; Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson
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2007; Nickerson 2007a). Therefore, there must be some component of personal contact,
beyond information exposure, that effects mobilization.
3.2 CHALLENGING THE TIE STRENGTH ASSUMPTION IN THE MOBILIZATION
LITERATURE
In 2000, Gerber and Green define a baseline marginal effect for face-to-face
stranger interaction of 2.43 percentage points, unadjusted and approximately 8.7
percentage points when adjusted for the rate of contact. Similar to Dale and Strauss
(2009), Gerber and Green (2000) highlight that deep, genuine social bonds are not
required for mobilization efforts to be effective. The authors detect significant turnout
effects from social interactions when the person delivering the mobilization message
(i.e. the canvasser) and the person receiving the message (i.e. the target) are strangers.
Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson (2007) build on the work of Gerber and
Green (2000), McClurg (2003; 2004), and Lassen (2005) in an attempt to show that
personal relationships have an additive effect on mobilization messages that make them
more effective than just contact from a stranger. Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson
(2007) hypothesize that, “Invitations to vote from neighbors should be more effective
than invitations to vote from strangers because canvassers from the neighborhood are
recognized and therefore more trusted” (4). Sinclair et al.’s (2007) theory does not
require that canvassers and targets have the type of social bond alluded to by
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). Instead, the authors argue that being able to recognize
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someone as a member of your community, your ingroup “increase[s] the unspoken
level of interpersonal trust between canvasser and voter” (Sinclair, McConnell, and
Michelson 2007, p. 9). The authors go on to claim that this increased trust is, “an
important component of social capital that…make[s] mobilization messages more
effective” (Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson 2007, p. 9). In their experiment Sinclair,
McConnell, and Michelson (2007) use ZIP codes to define communities; however, how,
if at all, does their theory apply as communities move online?
3.3 CONNECTEDNESS, TRUST, AND TURNOUT
My critique of the social ties argument often made in the interpersonal
mobilization literature is inspired by contact theory. Contact theory provides the basic
framework for understanding how behavior modification can result from interpersonal
interactions without relying on tie strength (Allport 1954). Although it is framed in the
context of resolving conflict between two opposing groups, Rothbart and John (1985)
identify three criteria to determine when interpersonal interaction will be most effective
for producing behavioral modifications: (1) the outgroup members are perceived as
typical of their cultural group, (2) but the outgroup members’ behavior is not consistent
with their stereotype, and (3) contact between group members occurs often and in a
variety of social contexts. While Rothbart and John’s (1985) model is designed to explain
how to overcome racial stereotypes, I interpret it more abstractly as steps to establishing
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the necessary trust that facilitates behavior modification. It answers the question: how
does one come to be perceived as a member of the ingroup?
Given the design of studies by Gerber and Green (2000) and Sinclair, McConnell,
and Michelson (2007), tie strength cannot be identified as the cause of increased
mobilization effectiveness; however, their varying results indicate that there is clearly
an interpersonal component that makes mobilization efforts more effective as
messengers become less like professional canvassers and more like our immediate
social networks. I posit that trust, not tie strength, drives these findings.
Michelson (2003) shows that “canvassing can have…a substantively large effect
on voter turnout when the canvasser and the targeted voter share ethnicity and political
partisanship,” although neither was explicitly confirmed for targets (258). Therefore,
Gerber and Green’s (2000) experiment is an example of a weak trust design since
canvassers are explicitly encouraged to behave as stereotypical canvassers. It is likely
that the canvassers are viewed as credible to the targets, but fail to establish further
trust.
Conversely, Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson (2007) provides examples of
how canvassers who establish themselves as members of the target’s ingroup are more
effective. In the Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson (2007) study, canvassers did not
rely on existing personal relationships but rather ties to the community to build trust
with the targets. This action did not necessarily allow canvassers to build personal
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relationships with the targets, but according to Rothbart and John, if the targets
recognize the canvassers, they should be perceived as more trustworthy and therefore,
the target should be been more receptive to the canvassers’ message.
Although mobilization studies rely on building trust, the research designs
consistently fail to include Rothbart and John’s (1985) third criteria, frequent and
contextually diverse contact. The existing mobilization studies all provide just one faceto-face intervention. It is with this in mind that I structure my evaluation of Facebook, a
social network site (SNS), to deliver mobilization messages.
3.4 BUILDING TRUST ONLINE
For various reasons, researchers have attempted to understand if contact via the
Internet produces attitudinal and behavioral changes similar to those observed from
offline contact. In 2006, Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna declare, “contact schemes
over the Internet may prove exceptionally effective tools in the pursuit of improved
interpersonal and intergroup relations” (842). By 2010, Kobayashi discovers evidence
that Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna’s expectation is true. Observing social tolerance
among a self-organized group of heterogeneous online gamers, Kobayashi (2010) finds
that, “enhanced social tolerance toward online community members is generalized to
offline settings” (546). Kobayashi (2010) attributes repeated contact that the Internet,
and specifically SNSs, allows users to be contacted more frequently than offline contact.
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3.5 MOBILIZATION THROUGH SOCIAL NETWORK SITES
Given the limited body of politically focused SNS research and the
methodological challenges of studying established networks (both online and offline), I
intentionally rely on the premise of frequent exposure for testing the ability for SNS
communication to mobilize voters. Although the message delivery system is a “social
network” site, it is important to note that the hypothesis of this essay is not dependent
on the formation or strength of social bonds between the canvasser and the target.
Instead, I evaluate how SNS contact compares to the previously described face-to-face
mobilization efforts.
There are several reasons why SNS contact should prove at least as effective as
face-to-face contact. First, unlike the canvassers in Gerber and Green (2000), SNS
canvassers are not strangers to the target when they are canvassed. The targets have
“friended” the canvasser which means they have exchanged some amount of personal
information (i.e. their name or email address) to establish their online relationship, or
they have accepted a request from the canvasser. In addition to not being strangers, the
target has to interact with the canvasser in an active manner to establish their online
connection prior to receiving any messages. Second, unlike the canvassers in for
Sinclair, McConnell, and Michelson (2007) study, SNS canvassers are not dependent on
the target’s memory of passing them on the street or seeing them at the grocery store.
Social network sites remind the target that they “know” the canvasser. Third,
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Kobayashi (2010) shows that users conceptualize people they accept in their online
network as members of their ingroup even if they would not be conceptualized that
way offline. Moreover, all of the messages users are presented with appear to the user
with identical importance. Social network sites do no indicate which messages
appearing in a user’s “News Feed” come from strong ties and which come from week
ties. I suspect this helps neutralize tie strength effects and may even facilitate greater
trust between the canvasser and target since their content is presented next to content
from people with whom the users have the strongest identity. Fourth, SNSs allow for
repeated contact. In addition to receiving multiple contacts about voting, the targets are
exposed to a variety of other content that help build trust and establish the canvasser as
a member of the target’s ingroup. According to Michelson (2003), mobilization
messages that are delivered by an ingroup member are effective for increasing voter
turnout.
3.6 HYPOTHESIS
Exposure to information makes information more salient and people are more
receptive to information they receive from people they perceive as members of their
ingroup. Therefore:
H1

Subjects exposed to the political mobilization messages should vote in the 2010
general election at a greater rate than subjects not exposed to these messages.
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3.7 DESIGN
Understanding how people are receiving political information from their social
networks online is incredibly difficult. SNSs log all of the actions their users take on
their site and all of the interactions that occur between their users. These data could
produce significant learning about how users inform and influence each other;
however, social network companies are largely unwilling to allow scholars to analyze
these data. Therefore, researchers have been forced to rely on users’ self-report of their
behavior and interactions. As with all self-reported data, respondents are likely to be
affected by limited recall capacity and social desirability bias; however poor question
wording also handicaps online social network behavior and interaction reports even
further. For example, survey questions regarding political discussion typically fail to
address online communication specifically. Instead, a survey may ask respondents how
often they discussed politics with someone in their social network. Given that users are
not yet socialized to include their online social network communication in response to
such a question, online discussions often go unreported. Moreover, respondents can
have a difficult time remembering if their discussions took place online or offline. In
addition to these data collection challenges, the political environment also affects users
in non-random ways. The campaigns, candidates, and media are all engaging with
users, both offline and online. Therefore, even with access to every Facebook interaction
and/or perfect self-reporting it is impossible to isolate a specific online action that caused
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real-world voting behavior changes through observational data alone. Only through
random condition assignment and researcher administered treatments can causality be
determined.
Therefore, to isolate the effect of nonpartisan mobilization information delivered
by a peer through a SNS, I invited students enrolled in each of the introductory
American government classes and introductory international relations classes at
Georgia State University to “friend” me on Facebook. For this study, participants were
recruited by me in-person. Upon being introduced by the instructor, I told students that
I was a fellow student, working on a research project for a class in which I needed to
observe how people were using Facebook to talk about politics. Students were
instructed to send a “friend request” to my actual Facebook account, but were given no
indication that I would be attempting to passively influence their voting behavior by
administering political treatments to a randomly selected subset of them.
To participate in the project, participants had to be enrolled in one of the political
science classes articulated earlier, have an active Facebook account at the time of
enrollment, send me a “friend request” before the deadline that included their name
and full birth date, and be at least 18 years of age on Election Day 2010. Using a
relatively homogeneous sample of university students who all have similar access and
familiarity to Facebook minimizes the demographic variance in the sample and ensures
that participants have relatively similar SNS usage behavior. By randomly assigning
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participants to treatment and control conditions, any participation selection bias,
demographic skews, or other systematic errors associated with studying a convenience
sample of college students are minimized.
Ensuring participants are actually exposed to stimuli is difficult through
Facebook. At the time of the experiment, exposure to specific “Status Updates” via their
News Feed was dependent on the user’s number of “friends” and personal settings. 8
This means that some participants may need to navigate to my profile page in order to
be exposed to the stimuli. Additionally, users may “hide” or opt-out of being presented
with content from a specific “friend.” While the inability to strictly control exposure to
stimuli is undesirable for an experiment, those being sheltered from or opting-out of
receiving the stimuli should be randomized across conditions preventing any systemic
selection bias. Furthermore, such limits to exposure make it more difficult to detect any
treatment effects. Nevertheless, I discouraged participants from sheltering themselves
from the stimuli by posting two extra credit exam questions during the semester.
Students unable or unwilling to “friend” me on Facebook could request that the
questions be sent to them via email. While this incentive slightly increases the burden

8

Users can control the information presented to them by: setting a cap on the number of friends included
in their News Feed or “hiding” specific friends to prevent all stories from that particular user/friend
from appearing in their News Feed. Additionally, the News Feed is populated by an “algorithm [that
decides which information to present to the user] based on a few factors: how many friends are
commenting on a certain piece of content, who posted the content, and what type of content it is (e.g.
photo, video, or Status Update).” These were the guidelines governing information presentation when
the experiment was administered. For the most recent guidelines see
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=16162.
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on participants by asking them to monitor my profile page, such a behavior is
consistent with typical Facebook usage.
Before accepting any friend requests, I generated a randomized list of 1000
identification numbers and randomly assigned these identification numbers to an
experimental condition in groups of 50. Therefore, every group of 50 identification
numbers included 25 treatment assignments and 25 control assignments. This method
allowed me to blindly assign participants to one of the experimental conditions before I
ever made contact with them. To ensure the confidentially of participants, I randomly
assigned participants an identification number as their requests were received. This
ensured that the first person to send me a friend request was not the first person listed
in my dataset. For example, the first participant to send me a friend request might be
randomly assigned identification number 123, which happened to be randomly
assigned to the control condition before I ever made contact with the participant. The
eighth person to send me a friend request might be randomly assigned identification
number 124, which happened to also be randomly assigned to the control condition.
To control which participants were exposed to specific pieces of content, I used
the “Friends List” feature on Facebook. The “Friends List” feature provides users with a
way to categorize their friends into subsets or lists. The feature was intended to allow
users to segment their “friends” with the intention of being able to tailor which pieces
of content a person assigned to a specific category has access to. For example, a user’s
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close friends may be interested in seeing pictures of her weekend road trip, but she may
wish to hide this information from her boss. When posting the photos, the user could
choose to exclude people labeled as “Boss” or “Coworker” from accessing this content
specifically while still allowing individuals in the excluded category to view all of the
other content the user posted. In October 2010, during this study, Facebook revealed
that just five percent of users were taking advantage of this feature (O’Brien 2010).
Instead of creating lists called “Family” or “Coworkers,” I created “Treatment”
and “Control” and categorized each participant according to the condition their
identification number had been randomly assigned. Having two mutually exclusive
lists of participants on Facebook allowed me to manipulate the audience of a specific
“Status Update” while ensuring that all of the other content available from my profile
was identical between conditions. No participants had access to my political affiliation,
relationship status, or work history via Facebook. Participants received several
“Updates” from me during October 2010 and into November 2010 (see Table 5 for
stimulus protocol). All participants received three stimuli from me the first week, four
stimuli the second week, seven stimuli the third, and fourth weeks, and two stimuli the
fifth week (these were the day before Election Day and Election Day). Each condition
received their stimuli on the same day and at approximately the same time.
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Table 5. Mobilization Experiment Stimulus Protocol
Political
Treatment

Conversational
Treatment

X

X

X

X

X

--

--

X

Week 1 – October 4-10, 2010
10/5 - To get you into the Halloween spirit :)

KXVO "Pumpkin Dance"
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4IC7qaNr7I>
10/8 - it is easier to be wise for others than for ourselves
10/10 - in case you missed the debate...

Gubernatorial Debate: Informing the Student Vote
<http://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid101546288001?bclid
=102155556001&bctid=624203912001>
10/10 - such a sad ending :(
Crowds Turn Out To Support Braves
<http://www.wsbtv.com/video/25349415/index.html>
Week 2 – October 11-17, 2010
10/11 - is spending some time trying to figure out who to vote for on
Nov. 2nd

X

10/11 - whoa, Cox and Arquette separated!

X

10/13 - It is said, "Man invented language to satisfy his deep need to
complain." If that's true then man invented Facebook to ensure he
had an audience ;)

X

X

10/14 - Holly likes Jim's Pancakes (Website).

X

X

10/17 - Make all the ads stop... be sure to vote the 1st time!
Could bruising Georgia governor's race be headed for a runoff?
<http://www.times-herald.com/opinion/Could-bruising-Georgiagovernors-race-be-headed-for-a-runoff-1339862>

X

--

10/17 - A little study break :)
Think you know celebrity and entertainment news?
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2010-10-14-pop-quiz_N.htm>

--

X
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Week 3 – October 18-24, 2010
10/18 - Procrastinate now, don't put it off.

X

X

10/19 - Just two weeks until Election Day! Do you know who
you're voting for yet?

X

--

10/19 - Just under two weeks until Halloween! Do you know what
you are going to be yet?

--

X

X

--

--

X

X

X

X

--

--

X

10/23 - Bad politicians are sent to Washington by good people
who don't vote.

X

--

10/23 - Wit is educated insolence.

--

X

10/24 - I'm use to using Mad Men for a little Sunday evening study
break... I suppose the end of their season means I'll get more work
done :(

X

X

10/20 - Is there truth in all the negative ads? You decide...
Analysis: Barnes-Deal political ads get uglier | The Augusta
Chronicle
<http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/government/elections/georgia-elections/201010-16/analysis-barnes-deal-political-ads-getuglier?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+A
ugustachroniclecomLatestNews+%28AugustaChronicle.com%3A+Latest+News+&
+Blogs%29>

10/20 - So how is the GSU football team doing???
College | Analysis of the opening of football season at Georgia
State University
<http://www.dragonparadox.com/online-education/onlinedegree-onlineeducationonlinecollege-onlineschool/college-analysis-of-the-opening-of-football-season-atgeorgia-state-university/>

10/21 - The ultimate inspiration is the deadline.
10/22 - Hours of fun :)

FIND OUT THE FACTS!
<http://politifact.com/georgia/statements/?page=1>

10/22 - Hours of fun :)

MAD MEN YOURSELF!
<http://www.amctv.com/originals/madmen/madmenyourself/>
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Week 4 – October 25-31, 2010
10/25 - "Like" this if you plan to vote Nov. 2!

X

--

10/25 - "Like" this if you are ready for some trick-or-treating!!

--

X

10/26 - Let's do the time warp again!

X

X

10/27 - It's getting down to the wire. Time to decide who
you'll be voting for on Tuesday!

X

--

10/27 - It's getting down to the wire. Time to decide what
you're going to be for Halloween!

--

X

10/28 - Time to find your polling place!
Google Maps
<http://maps.google.com/maps/mpl?moduleurl=http%3A%2F
%2Fmaps.google.com%2Fmapfiles%2Fmapplets%2Felections
%2Fvoter-info%2Fvoter-info.xml>

X

--

--

X

10/29 - Polls are open Tuesday, November 2nd from 7 AM - 7
PM. If you will be away from home on Tuesday be sure to
vote early! In GA, registered voters can vote in person at their
registrar's office.
Find Tour Registrar's Office
<http://www.sos.georgia.gov/elections/elections/voter_inform
ation/2000_voter_info.asp>

X

--

10/29 - We suffer primarily not from our vices or our
weaknesses, but from our illusions. We are haunted, not by
reality, but by those images we have put in their place.
Top 10 Haunted Hotels
<http://travel.yahoo.com/p-interests-36436907>

--

X

X

--

10/28 - Time to carve some pumpkins!

10 tips for a great jack o' lantern
<http://green.yahoo.com/blog/greenpicks/291/10-tips-for-agreat-jack-o-lantern.html>

10/30 - Not bad for somebody still in high school. Ready! Set!
Vote!!!

GO VOTE on November 2, 2010!
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OjnCDtwrNDk&feature=
share>
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10/30 - Not bad for an 80 year old cartoon. Ready! Set! Boo!
Disney's (1929) The Skeleton Dance
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnTj8aMQxfE&feature=
share>

--

X

10/31 - 311 + Halloween costumes = awesome fun

X

X

11/1 - 5 Simple Steps for How to Be a Good Citizen
Tomorrow:
1) Wake up before 7PM tomorrow (or just don't go to bed
tonight),
2) Make sure you know where your polling place is and how
to get there,
3) Find your ID and keys,
4) Drive to your polling place, (make sure you are in line to
vote by 7PM; and finally
5) Pull the levers or touch the screen!

X

--

11/1 - 5 Simple Steps for Recovering from a Candy Coma:
1) Wake up at some point,
2) Skip the coffee,
3) Plan on having a healthy lunch like a salad,
4) Combat the 3PM candy craving; and finally
5) Drink some water and head to bed early!

--

X

11/2 - “Like” this if you are a good citizen and voted today
(voting early counts too)!

X

--

11/2 - “Like” this if you are a good friend and called your BFF
today!

--

X

Week 5 – November 1-2, 2010

11/2 - EVERYONE VIA FACEBOOK DEFAULT:

·

Showed users which of their friends reported that they voted.
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During the course of the experiment, stimuli were administered to each
condition on 23 different occasions. On nine of these occasions, both conditions received
the same non-political stimuli. For the remaining 14 occasions, the control condition
continued to received non-political stimuli; while, the treatment condition received
messages that encouraged them to think about the election and provided logistical
information (such as the date of the election or poll times) for voting in the November
2010 election. The days on which political stimuli were administered were randomized
weekly, excluding Election Day. On Election Day, the treatment condition was explicitly
reminded to vote.
After the election, I attempted to match people who “friended” me as part of the
experiment to the publicly available voter file for the state of Georgia using data
available from their Facebook profile and the birth date they provided when enrolling
in the study. There are two major deficiencies in how participants were matched to the
voter file. First, due to the cost of obtaining a national voter file, I had to restrict analysis
to just those participants who could be matched to the state of Georgia’s voter file.
Therefore, participants who were registered in another state are coded as not registered
in this dataset. Second, the birth date field for people born after 1989 had not yet been
updated when I was matching participants to the voter file. Instead of listing the voter’s
full birth date the voter file showed 01/01/1990, 01/01/1991, or 01/01/1992. Therefore, for
anyone born in 1989 or earlier, a match was considered positive if a voter file search
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resulted in a single record in which the name available on Facebook (or a name in
which the name on Facebook is an obvious derivative) and the entire birth date were
identical. For anyone born in 1990 or later, a match was considered positive if a voter
file search resulted in a single record in which the name available on Facebook (or a
name in which the name on Facebook is an obvious derivative) and the birth year were
identical. Regardless of birth year, if multiple records were returned, I used data
available on the participants’ Facebook profile to match them to the proper record if it
existed. This included any email addresses they listed, their current city, the address of
people they identified as family members, or the town where their high school is
located (see Appendix D for examples of matched and unmatched records).
After identifying the voter file record for each participant if it existed, I compare
the turnout rate of the registered participants who were assigned to the treatment
condition to the turnout rate of the registered participants who were assigned to the
control condition. I hypothesize that users exposed to the political treatments as a result
of their condition assignment should exhibit greater rates of voting than users assigned
to the control condition.
3.8 DATA & ANALYSIS
Approximately 2800 students were invited to participate in the study and 604
students enrolled in the experiment by friending me on Facebook. Among these
participants, 304 were assigned to the treatment condition and 300 were assigned to the
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control condition. Approximately 59 percent of the participants assigned to the control
condition were registered to vote compared to 55 percent of the treatment condition.
This difference is not statically significant at the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test. This
means that those assigned to the treatment condition were no more likely to be
registered to vote and/or matched to the voter file in the state of Georgia than the
control condition. A total of 344 participants could be positively matched to the Georgia
voter file. Approximately, 51 percent of these participants were assigned to the control
condition and the remaining 49 percent were assigned to the treatment condition.
Again, this difference is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.
For the remainder of the analysis I will focus on the 344 participants who could
be positively matched to the state of Georgia voter file. Table 6 shows the voter turnout
rates of each condition in 2008 (Voted 2008 General Election) and their registration rates as
of 2010 (Registered by 2010). The table also includes the average age (Age), gender (Male)
and ethnic (Black) composition of each condition. In addition to the average number of
total friends participants had upon completing the study (Number of Facebook Friends), I
collected information regarding how many of their Facebook friends were also enrolled
in the experiment (Number of Mutual Friends), how many of these mutual friends were
assigned to the treatment condition (Number of Mutual Friends Assigned to Treatment
Condition), how many of these mutual friends I was able to match to the Georgia state
voter file (Number of Mutual Friends Registered to Vote in GA), how many of these mutual
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friends actually voted in the 2010 general election according to the Georgia state voter
file (Number of Mutual Friends Who Voted in 2010), and the percent of participants who
made at least one political post to their profile during the experiment (Made Political
Post) for each condition. Data for the variables Gender, Black, Number of Friends, Number
of Mutual Friends, and Made Political Post are collected from the Facebook profile pages of
the participants. To collect these data, I took screenshots of all the participants “Info”
pages and any stories that appeared on their wall that contained the keywords:
“Democrat,” “Election,” “Government,” “Obama,” “President,” “Republican,” and/or
“Vote,” I conduct a difference of means test for each variable. None of the differences
are significant at the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test with two exceptions: Number of
Facebook Friends and Number of Mutual Friends Who Voted in 2010.
Table 6. Mobilization Experiment Randomization Check
Treatment

Control

Percentage Who Voted in 2008 General Election

33%

28%

Percentage Registered by 2010

100%

100%

Mean Age

21.65

21.27

Percentage Male

29%

32%

Percentage Black

40%

40%

505.82

600.13

Mean Number of Mutual Friends

3.64

4.46

Mean Number of Mutual Friends Assigned to Treatment Condition

1.71

1.96

Mean Number of Mutual Friends Registered to Vote in GA

2.10

2.53

Mean Number of Mutual Friends Who Voted in 2010*

0.44

0.67

Mean Number of Participants Who Made Political Post

0.30

0.27

168

176

Demographics

Facebook Statistics
Mean Number of Facebook Friends*

N
* p<0.05; two-tailed test.
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Given the excessively large number of friends attributed to both conditions, I do
not believe the difference between conditions has any practical implication to the study,
nor do I have any reason to believe the difference is the result of a systematic
randomization error. Moreover, there were ten individuals whose network size was
abnormal when compared with the rest of the sample. Six of these participants had
networks much smaller than the rest of the sample. All six of these participants were
randomly assigned to the treatment condition. The remaining four participants had
networks much larger than the rest of the sample and three of these participants were
randomly assigned to the control condition. When I exclude these ten cases, the average
number of Facebook friends for someone assigned to the treatment condition is 516 and
the average number of Facebook friends for someone assigned to the control condition
is 572. This difference is not statically significant at the 0.05 level in a two-tailed test.
Measurement: The dependent variable, Voted in 2010, is coded one if the
participant’s vote history indicated that he or she voted in the 2010 general election and
zero for all others. The independent variable, Exposed to Political Treatment, is coded one
if participant was assigned to see political stimuli posted by me via Facebook and zero
for all others. Like Voted in 2010, Voted in 2008 is coded one if the participant’s vote
history indicated that he or she voted in the 2008 general election and zero for all others.
Registered by 2010 is coded one if the participant could be positively matched to the
voter file following the 2010 general election and zero for all others. Age is coded based
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on the birth date participants provided when enrolling in the study and is calculated as
of Election Day 2010. Male is coded one if the participant’s Facebook profile
information, photo, or name indicated his gender is male and zero for all others. Black is
coded one if the participant’s photo clearly indicated his or her ethnicity is black and
zero for all others. The ethnicity variable was coded based on researcher interpretation.
If the ethnicity of a participant was not obvious, the ethnicity of that participant was not
coded. While this potentially introduces systematic bias in the ethnicity variable, there
is no reason to believe that this error is skewed toward either condition. Number of
Facebook Friends is a ratio variable that indicates the total number of Facebook friends
the participant had at the end of the experiment. Number of Mutual Friends is also a ratio
variable that indicates the number of Facebook friends the participant had who were
also enrolled in the experiment. Number of Mutual Friends Assigned to Treatment Condition
is a ratio variable that indicates how many of the respondent’s enrolled friends were
assigned to the treatment condition. Number of Mutual Registered to Vote in GA and
Number of Mutual Friends Who Voted in 2010 are both ratio variables collected from the
voter file. Made Political Post is coded one if the participant made any posts that
contained the keywords: “Election,” “Democrat,” “Government,” “Obama,”
“President,” “Republican,” and/or “Vote” and zero for all others. Because many of the
participants were recruited from a course called “American Government,” stories
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clearly using the term “government” to refer to their course were coded as zero, not
one.
3.9 RESULTS
Approximately, 31 percent of participants assigned to the treatment condition
voted on November 2, 2010 compared to 23 percent of participants assigned to the
control condition. A t-test indicates that this difference is statically significant at the 0.05
level in a one-tailed test. The treatment effect is 8.2 percentage points (see Figure 1). This
unadjusted treatment effect is similar to the adjusted treatment effects discovered by
Gerber and Green (2000) when they tested door-to-door canvassing during local
elections in 1998.
35%

31%

30%
23%

25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Exposed to Mobilization Messages

Exposed to Placebo Messages

Figure 1. Voted in GA in 2010 General Election
My results are underscored by a logistical regression analysis, which is presented
in
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Table 7. Mobilization Experiment: Logit Coefficients: with and without Covariates
. The first model in Table 7 shows the effects of exposure to political stimuli on
turnout with no covariates. The second model includes covariates that might predict
voter turnout. Given the limited information that could be collected from participants, it
is likely this model is underspecified; however, it includes many of the same variables
that are widely used in observational turnout analysis.

Table 7. Mobilization Experiment: Logit Coefficients: with and without Covariates
Logit
Standard
Estimates
Errors
Model Without Covariates (N=344)
Exposed to Political Treatment

0.42*

0.25

-1.22*

0.18

Exposed to Political Treatment

0.43*

0.26

Voted in 2008

0.93**

0.30

Age

0.09**

0.03

Male

0.44

0.28

Black

0.37

0.27

_cons

-3.71**

0.75

_cons
Model With Covariates (N=330)

*p<0.05; ** p<0.005; one-tailed test.
3.10 DISCUSSION
The goal of this experiment is simply to establish if a mobilization effect from
SNS communication exists; therefore, multiple, strong messages were delivered over a
relatively lengthy period. Manipulations regarding the number of posts, type of posts
(links, status, direct appeals, informational), and timing of posts should all be evaluated
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more closely. For example, it is plausible that just reminding people to vote on Election
Day is enough to produce the effect observed here. Alternatively, it is possible that a
more conversational approach over a long period is necessary to garner larger effects.
In addition to the messages and their delivery, researchers studying social media,
including myself, need to explore more creative ways to measure the effects of tie
strength. Experimental research in this field thus far has been forced to rely on
relatively weak ties. Finding ways to predictably alter tie-strength should be among the
highest priorities for researchers studying social media if we are to understand the
political potential for this medium.
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4

2010 SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT SURVEY EXPERIMENT
In the previous chapters, social network site (SNS) users are shown to be able to

retain at least some of the political information presented to them through a SNS and
take action as a result of exposure to such information. However, the utility of
nonpartisan, noncontroversial information is limited in the context of a political
campaign. Therefore, it is necessary to determine if users can actually influence each
other’s opinions via SNSs in addition to just receiving information. With a simple click
of the “Share” button a candidate’s supporters have the potential to connect with
hundreds (sometimes thousands) of people. Supporters can now relay a campaign’s
message to their entire social network regardless of how interested their “friends” are in
such information. But, how valuable is such an endorsement?
4.1 WHAT IS A SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT
In April 2010, Facebook replaced a feature called “Become a fan” with their
traditional “Like” button (Siegler 2010). Both features allow users to share their support
of a celebrity, company, brand, item, news story, etc. with their “friends.” The button
allows users to endorse content that they enjoy and share their endorsement with their
network.
Early in its development Facebook made a strategic decision not to allow
advertising to populate the content users receive from their network. Instead, the site
encourages users to endorse content and produces advertisements that are designed to
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be as unobtrusive as possible. The prohibition of slick banners and flash animation
seems as though it would make advertising on Facebook unappealing, but by allowing
users to broadcast their endorsement of content, Facebook capitalizes on the principles
of word of mouth (WOM) advertising. Moreover, given that each user is connected with
hundreds (sometimes thousands) of other users, Facebook drastically increases the
number of individuals exposed to a user’s endorsements. However, are endorsements
posted on SNSs effective?
Facebook provides two ways for users to express their endorsement of content.
First, users can “Like” content and that endorsement can be made public by the owner
of the content. For example, if a user “Likes” a candidate, when the candidate buys
advertising on Facebook, the user’s network will see that the user “Liked” that
candidate. Second, the user can post information about the candidate in their own
words to their network. The second method is an example of more traditional WOM
advertising.
4.2 INFORMATION EXPOSURE AND SOURCES
The political science literature shows Americans are woefully uninformed about
politics (Converse 1975; Kinder and Sears 1985; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996);
however, voters are generally able to make correct voting choices (Lau and Redlawsk
1997, 2001). The information exposure literature indicates that being exposed to
information makes people more knowledgeable about the information they were
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exposed to, but people often evaluate the information source rather than just the
information when they making decisions. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) argue
that by evaluating information sources rather than the information itself, “people can be
knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices without necessarily possessing
a large body of knowledge about politics” (19).
The political psychology literature focuses largely on the cognitive processes that
aid citizens in developing policy preferences and determining their vote choice. Much
of this literature examines cue-taking (Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Kuklinski and Quirk
2000) and heuristics (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991;
Zaller 1992; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In 1992, Zaller claimed that people
use the reputations of message deliverers as contextual information to evaluate the
messages being relayed. In talking about elites as cue providers, Zaller (1992) argues
that if the messenger is reputable the message must be reliable. But, what makes a
messenger reputable?
Some authors, such as Neustadt (1960), argue that a title or office make the
messenger reputable. For example, Neustadt (1960) says that the power of the president
to persuade lies with the position, professional reputation, and public prestige of the
president. Other authors, such as Brady and Sniderman (1985), approach find that
people use “affect calculus” when presented with two options to determine which
option best represents their beliefs. “Affect calculus” is consistent with Neustadt’s
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(1960) argument that if people like the president they will support his policies. Brady
and Sniderman (1985) define “affect calculus” as requiring a person know his or her
feelings about a group in order to adopt the policy preferences about that group. Lupia
(1994) provides an example of affect calculus by evaluating voters’ preferences towards
a series of automobile insurance reform propositions in California. Lupia finds that
respondents familiar with the insurance industry’s position were better able to
determine how to vote consistent with their preference on the propositions than those
who were unfamiliar with the industry’s position. Presumably, voters could identify if
they agreed or disagreed with the insurance industry without needing to fully
understand the text of the proposition. However, this work assumes one has a
preference and can correctly identify those who share their preferences.
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) expand the work of elite cue-taking to define
persuasion more broadly. The authors define persuasion as, “one person's successful
attempt to change the beliefs of another” (Lupia and McCubbins 1998, p. 40). Yet, the
work in this area does little to show that beliefs are changed. Instead, Lupia and
McCubbins (1998) describe a principle-agent relationship; the principle (message
receiver) must perceive that the agent (messenger) has interests in common with them
and that messenger is knowledgeable about the information they are providing.
Therefore, it is possible that the message receiver has no preference. In fact, Lupia and
McCubbins (1994) argue that, “People often substitute the advice of others for the
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information they lack” (2). And, that, “This substitution can give people the capacity for
reasoned choice” (Lupia and McCubbin 1994, p. 2).
However, which sources are used for substitution is questionable. In some cases,
people may exhibit bandwagon effects. In this case, the message receiver is not
connected to a particular individual from whom they are receiving information, but
rather seeing that others are behaving a certain way causes them to behave similarly.
For example, Skalaban (1988) shows that positive public opinion polls encourage those
without firmly established opinions to assimilate a positive opinion of the leading
candidate. Other scholars, including Lupia and McCubbins (1998) argue that a key
component of successful cue taking is that the messenger shares “common interests”
with the message receiver.
However, “common interest” can be broadly defined. For example, Neustadt
(1960) might argue that national policy agenda is of common interest to all Americans.
Neustadt argues that the prestige associated with messenger’s title (i.e. President of the
United States) is inherently reputable. Other scholars argue that cultural identity can be
used as a heuristic for assuming common interest (McDermott 2009). In this case, the
ethnicity of the messenger is used to validate the reputation of the messenger. Still,
others argue that social connections which are traditionally organized around common
interests can be exceptional sources of political persuasion (Rosenstone and Hansen
1993). In explaining how networks persuade each other to vote, Rosenstone and Hansen
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(1993) write that networks,” create solidarity rewards and bestow them, selectively, on
those who act in the common interest” (23). While promise of reward or threat of
retribution may not be necessary to persuasion, these tools socialize people to be
responsive to those in their networks.
4.3 SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND POLITICAL PERSUASION
While Americans still use traditional communication methods to maintain their
social networks, they are increasingly incorporating the use of SNSs, However, SNSs
lower the threshold for connecting, so users are able to easily expand the size of their
networks. Unlike traditional social networks that are often formed around common
interests, SNSs are not necessarily held to that same standard. Sites such as Facebook
allow users to “collect” up to 5000 “friends” through a personal profile account.
As of January 2012, the SNS, Facebook, claimed that its average user had
approximately 130 “friends;” however Facebook also claims that 80 percent of its users
live outside the United States. Therefore, 20 percent of its users are concentrated in a
single country. Given that it is unlikely other countries experience similar penetration
rates, it is reasonable to assume that the average American Facebook user has a network
much larger than 130 “friends.”
Given that users can establish so many social connections so quickly and easily, it
is unclear how users evaluate the information they receive through SNSs. Because it is
easier to drastically expand the size of one’s network users may deal with evaluating

65
information source reputations in several ways. First, users may devalue all of the
information they receive through SNSs regardless of the messenger. Second, users may
be able to value some messengers over others the same way they do in offline networks.
Third, users may simply give everyone they have “friended” the benefit of the doubt
and treat all messengers equally.
4.4 DESIGN
To isolate the effect of political endorsements delivered by a peer (rather than an
elite) through a SNS, I invited students enrolled in several of the introductory American
government classes from a large, diverse southern university to first “friend” me on
Facebook for approximately one month and second take a survey in which they were
presented one of three SNS endorsement manipulations. The survey in which the
manipulations were presented was a department-wide omnibus survey. Students had
two independent opportunities for extra credit. I posted two extra credit exam
questions during the semester through Facebook. Students unable or unwilling to
“friend” me through Facebook could send me an email to receive these two questions.
In addition, respondents who completed the survey received extra course credit for
their participation. Students were not required to “friend” me to complete the survey
and an alternative extra credit project of equal value was available to students unwilling
to complete the survey.
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For this study, I recruited participants in-person and used my actual Facebook
profile to communicate with participants. Upon being introduced by the instructor, I
told students that I was a fellow student, working on a project for class in which I
needed to observe how people were using Facebook to talk about politics.
To participate in the experiment, participants had to have access to the Internet,
have an active Facebook account at the time of enrollment, provide their name and
birthday, and be at least 18 years old as of November 2, 2010. Using a relatively
homogeneous sample of university students who all have similar access and familiarity
to Facebook minimizes the demographic variance in the sample and ensures that
participants have relatively similar SNS usage behavior. By randomly assigning
participants to treatment and control conditions, any participation selection bias,
demographic skews, or other systematic errors associated with studying a convenience
sample of college students are minimized.
In order to build a relationship with participants I posted several “Status
Updates” during October 2010 and into November 2010. During the course of the study,
messages were administered to Facebook participants on 23 different occasions. All
participants received three messages from me the first week, four messages the second
week, seven messages the third and fourth weeks, and two messages (Monday and
Election Day) the fifth week. In the execution of a separate study, 14 of the 23 messages
administered to a randomly selected subset of the Facebook participants were
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nonpartisan, noncontroversial mobilization messages. These messages included mostly
logistical information such as reminding users what times the polls would be open on
Election Day and providing a link to help them find their polling place.
Ensuring participants view the content I post on Facebook is difficult. At the time
of the experiment, exposure to specific “Status Updates” via their News Feed was
dependent on the user’s number of “friends” and personal settings.5 This means that
some participants may need to navigate to my profile page in order to be exposed to the
stimuli. Additionally, users may “hide” or opt-out of being presented with content from
a specific “friend.” However, those being sheltered from or opting-out of being exposed
to the content I posted should be randomized across participants and prevent any
systemic selection bias. Furthermore, such limits to exposure should make it more
difficult to detect any treatment effects. Nevertheless, I discouraged participants from
sheltering themselves from the stimuli by posting two extra credit exam questions
during the semester. Students unable or unwilling to “friend” me through Facebook
could send me an email to receive these two questions. While this incentive slightly
increases the burden on participants by asking them to monitor my profile page, such a
behavior is consistent with typical Facebook usage.
Approximately one month after the last message was administered to
participants through Facebook, the online omnibus survey was available to all of the
students who were originally invited to “friend” me through Facebook (see Appendix
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C). The survey was not limited to only those students who actually “friended” me. The
survey included three SNS endorsement manipulations—screenshots that were
fabricated to appear as though they were taken from Facebook. My endorsement of a
candidate was altered in each of the images (see Table 8). Respondents were randomly
assigned to be exposed to one of these treatments and then asked questions about their
favorability toward the endorsed candidate, the trustworthiness of the endorsed
candidate, and their likelihood to vote for the endorsed candidate.
The first treatment, No Endorsement, was a traditional Facebook column
advertisement with no named endorsement. The second treatment, Named Endorsement,
was the same advertisement; however, it identified me as someone who “Liked” the
candidate along with six other unspecified “friends.” This type of endorsement is the
result of a user clicking the “Like” button on the advertisement or from becoming a
“Fan” of/clicking the “Like” button on the candidate’s profile page. The third treatment,
Update, was a screenshot of a “Status Update” from me asking people to vote for the
candidate. This treatment was presented as if it were part of the respondent’s “News
Feed.”
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Table 8. Social Endorsement Experiment Treatments
No Endorsement

Named Endorsement

Update

The candidate being evaluated for this experiment was Susana A. Mendoza who
was running for (and won) the city clerk position in Chicago, Illinois. This candidate
was chosen because of the local nature of her election, her willingness to participate,
and her physical distance from the respondents. Additionally, subjects were exposed to
the treatments after the election. So, even in the unlikely event that a Chicago voter
participated in the experiment, their ballot would have already been counted.
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4.5 HYPOTHESES
Word of mouth advertising and cue taking rely on networks of individuals
sharing information and being responsive to that information. However, unlike pure
information sharing, word of mouth advertising is a statement of judgment. The
endorser shares his or her opinion and tries to persuade others to use him or her as cue
for how they should think or behave. Unlike educators, endorsers ask others to share
their opinion rather than just be aware of the information being presented.
The hypotheses outlined below attempt to understand if SNS endorsements, in
the form of an endorsed Facebook advertisement or Status Update message, can cause
people to adopt the feelings conveyed by the endorsement. Moreover, I attempt to
distinguish between bandwagon effects—seeing that others have endorsed the content
makes it more appealing—verses a social effect, in which the observer reacts based on
his or her familiarity with the endorser. Therefore, I expect:
H1 :

Respondents exposed to the Named Endorsement treatment should report more
positive ratings of the candidate on measures of favorability, trustworthiness,
and likelihood to support than those exposed to the No Endorsement treatment.

H2 :

Respondents exposed to the Update treatment should report more positive
ratings of the candidate on measures of favorability, trustworthiness, and
likelihood to support than those exposed to the No Endorsement treatment.
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H3 :

Respondents who remember friending me should report more positive ratings of
the candidate on measures of favorability, trustworthiness, and likelihood to
support when exposed to the Named Endorsement or Update treatments than
respondents who do not remember friending me.

4.6 DATA & ANALYSIS
Sample: Survey data were collected from 651 respondents and included 104
people who also friended me through Facebook. However, five survey respondents did
not recall friending me and 50 survey respondents thought they friended me even
though they did not (see Table 9 for randomization check).
Table 9. Social Endorsement Experiment Randomization Check
No Endorsement

Named
Endorsement

Update

Percentage Male

37%

28%*

34%

Percentage Hispanic

17%

12%

13%

Mean Age

21.46

21.60

21.44

Somewhat
Interested

Somewhat
Interested

Somewhat
Interested

Average Number of Facebook
Friends
(mean category chosen by user)

101-200

101-200

101-200

Mean Usage Per Week (days)

4.68

4.94

4.84

Percentage actually friended
through FB

16%

20%

16%

Percentage assigned to receive
mobilization messages
through FB

8%

11%

9%

Mean Relationship Rating

1.84

2.32

2.19

Demographics

Average Interest in Politics
(mean category chosen by respondent)
Facebook Statistics

* p<0.05; two-tailed test.
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Measurement: There are three dependent variables for this study; Favorability,
Trustworthiness, and Likelihood to Support the endorsed candidate. Favorability and
Trustworthiness are both interval measures ranging from zero to ten where zero
indicates “Not at all favorable/trustworthy” and ten indicates “Extremely
favorable/trustworthy.” Likelihood to Support is a five-point measure asking respondents
how likely they would be to vote for the endorsed candidate. Responses for Likelihood to
Support range from “Not at all likely” to “Extremely likely” with a midpoint of
“Somewhat likely.”
The hypotheses of this paper break endorsements into two parts: being exposed
to an endorsement and familiarity with the endorser. Therefore, there are two types of
independent variables. First, I evaluate the treatments themselves: No Endorsement,
Named Endorsement, and Update. Second, I interact each of the three treatments and the
respondent’s relationship with me. I use several measures to define the respondent’s
relationship to me. Each of these measures are interacted with each of the treatments
and tested in separate models. . The relationship variable Actual Who Recall is a
dichotomous variable in which respondents who actually friended me through
Facebook and also reported being “friends” with me when taking the survey are coded
as one and all other respondents are coded as zero. This measure excludes eight people
who friended me through Facebook because they did not report friending me when
taking the survey. Because there were some survey respondents who thought that they
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friended me even though they did not, I include the relationship variable Perceived.
Perceived is a dichotomous variable in which all the respondents included in Actual Who
Recall are coded one, as are 50 additional survey respondents who reported being
“friends” with me through Facebook even though they were not. All other respondents
are coded as zero. Like Actual Who Recall, this measure excludes eight people who
friended me through Facebook because they did not report friending me when taking
the survey.
However, it is possible that those who do not recall friending me are still
positively affected by my endorsement since they went through the act of friending me.
Therefore, I test another relationship variable Primed in which all respondents who
friended me on Facebook are coded as one regardless of whether or not they remember
doing so and all other respondents are coded as zero. Unlike Actual Who Recall or
Perceived, this measure includes the eight people who friended me through Facebook
but did not report doing so when taking the survey. Finally, I include a comprehensive
variable, Primed & Perceived, in which respondents who actually friended me through
Facebook or thought that they friended me through Facebook are all coded as one and
those who affirm that they did not friend me through Facebook and actually did not
friend me through Facebook are coded as zero. This variable is meant to capture any
possible relationship effects.
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Because the treatments were not identical (the candidate’s picture and campaign
logo were used in two of the three treatments) and the candidate’s name is overtly
ethnic, I present two models. The first models in each set of tables show just the
experimental effects absent any control variables. The second model in each set of tables
includes control measures for gender, ethnicity. Male is a dichotomous variable in
which males are coded one and females are coded zero. Hispanic is a dichotomous
variable in which “Hispanic” is coded one and all other responses are coded zero. I also
include an age variable in the models addressing likelihood to vote for the candidate
since age is such a significant predictor of voting behavior. Age is a ratio variable
indicating the respondent’s age when they took the survey.
Additionally, some of the participants who friended me were exposed to five
weeks of political mobilization messages through Facebook for the mobilization study
presented in a previous chapter. Survey respondents who friended me on Facebook
were randomly assigned to receive these messages or not. None of the people who
friended me on Facebook were specifically incentivized to participate in the survey
associated with this study; however, it is possible that there could be correlation
between being exposed to voter mobilization messages and participatory behavior
beyond voting. Therefore, it is possible survey respondents who were exposed to the
voter mobilization messages through Facebook experienced a spillover effect that
caused them to feel more participatory and be willing to take the survey. If this is true,
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people who friended me and were exposed to voter mobilization messages could have
felt compelled to participate in the survey in a way that was systematically different
than those who friended me and were not exposed to mobilization messages. To control
for such bias I include Received Mobilization Messages, a dichotomous variable coded one
for those who could have been exposed to mobilization message by me through
Facebook and zero for all others.
Analysis: To test H1 and H2 I use an OLS regression model to analyze the
independent variables: No Endorsement, Named Endorsement, and Update against the
dependent variables, Favorability, Trustworthiness, and Likelihood to Support. No
Endorsement serves as the reference group in each of these models. I present the models
without control variables first (Table 10) then with control variables (Table 11). To test
H3 I use an OLS regression model to analyze the interaction between each of the
treatments (No Endorsement, Named Endorsement and Update) and each of the
relationship variables discussed earlier against the same dependent variables,
Favorability (Table 12), Trustworthiness (Table 14), and Likelihood to Support (Table 16). No
Endorsement serves as the reference group for these models. I present the models
without control variables first and then with the control variables discussed previously
for Favorability (Table 13), Trustworthiness (Table 15), and Likelihood to Support (Table 17).
In all the models testing H3, the effectiveness of the treatment and relationship
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interaction is analyzed within a single model, while the differences between
relationship definitions are evident when looking between models.
4.7 RESULTS
The OLS regression models presented in Table 10 show the effects of peer
endorsements via SNSs on an individual’s favorability, trust, and likelihood to support
the candidate endorsed. Counter to H1 and H2, the personalized treatments do not make
recipients more positive toward the candidate on any of the dependent variables.
Moreover, individuals exposed to the strongest treatment, a Status Update asking them
to support the candidate, exhibit a backfire effect. Survey respondents actually become
less favorable, trusting, and willing to support the endorsed candidate.
The magnitude of difference may seem small, approximately one point on a ten
point scale; however, this loss means that people receiving the treatment dip below a
neutral position which could have negative electoral or legislative effects for the
candidate. This is confirmed when analyzing the Likelihood to Support variable. While
the numerical magnitude of the change for Likelihood to Support is smaller than the other
dependent variables, the scale for this variable means that respondents exposed to the
Update treatment report being “Not very likely” to support the candidate while people
exposed to the No Endorsement and Named Endorsement advertisements report being
“Somewhat Likely” to support the candidate.
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Table 10. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Experimental
Treatments (without control variables)
Likelihood to
Favorability
Trustworthiness
Support
_cons

5.11**
(0.17)

4.95**
(0.16)

2.46**
(0.06)

Named Endorsement

-0.05
(0.24)

-0.17
(0.24)

-0.00
(0.10)

Update

-1.34**
(0.24)

-1.20**
(0.24)

-0.34**
(0.09)

N
R2

534
0.05

534
0.05

582
0.02

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

The results from Table 10 are consistent even after adding in control measures
for being exposed to mobilization messages by me through Facebook, gender, ethnicity,
and age where appropriate (see Table 11). Given that the candidate’s name is of
Hispanic origin, it is not surprising that Hispanics are more positive in their Likelihood to
Support the candidate. This behavior is consistent with the identity politics literature
(see McDermott 2009). Although the magnitude of loss for each of the dependent
variables for respondents exposed to the Update treatment is similar to that in the
previously presented models, the outcome for Likelihood to Support is unaffected by this
loss when control variables are included. This means that when controlling for exposure
to mobilization messages, gender, ethnicity, and age respondents all report being “Not
very likely” to support the candidate regardless of which treatment they saw.
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Table 11. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Experimental
Treatments (with control variables)
Likelihood to
Favorability
Trustworthiness
Support
_cons

5.03***
(0.19)

4.90***
(0.19)

2.16***
(0.40)

Named Endorsement

0.01
(0.24)

-0.11
(0.24)

0.06
(0.10)

Update

-1.33***
(0.25)

-1.19***
(0.24)

-0.34***
(0.10)

Received Mobilization
Messages

0.04
(0.36)

0.02
(0.34)

0.18
(0.14)

Male

0.04
(0.21)

-0.07
(0.20)

0.09
(0.09)

Hispanic

0.44
(0.35)

0.42
(0.35)

0.37*
(0.13)

Age
N
R2

0.01
(0.02)
524
0.07

533
0.06

518
0.06

* p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

The OLS regression models presented in
Table 12 through Table 17 evaluate Favorability, Trustworthiness, or Likelihood to
Support between those who are familiar with the endorser and those who are unfamiliar
with the endorser. Familiarity with the endorser is defined by four different “Friends”
variables: Actual Who Recall, Perceived, Primed, and Primed & Perceived. The “Friends”
variable included in the model is defined based on the column being evaluated.
Table 12 shows that counter to H3, respondents exposed to either Named
Endorsement or Status Update who actually friended me through Facebook and
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remembered doing so (Actual and Recall) are no more favorable towards the candidate
being endorsed than those who did not friend me through Facebook or those who
believed that they did not friend me. Moreover, there appears to be no priming effect
because respondents who friended me regardless of remembering to do so (Primed) do
not report any significant difference in favorability towards the candidate than those
who did not friend me through Facebook.
However, when the definition of “remember friending me” is expanded to
include those who say they friended me although they did not (Perceived), respondents
exposed to the Update treatment report being slightly more favorable toward the
candidate than those who do not remember friending me. Interestingly, this effect is not
noticeable among those exposed to the Named Endorsement. H3 does not expect there to
be differences between the Named Endorsement and Update treatments since both
treatments show the respondent who is endorsing the content. However, Status
Updates appear to be potentially effective for increasing people’s favorability towards
the content an endorsement endorses while Facebook’s traditional advertisements are
not.
While these results are encouraging, what is more concerning is that regardless
of how “remember friending me” is defined, those with whom I had no relationship
exhibit a sizable backfire effect when exposed to the Update treatment. Users appear to
tolerate endorsed advertisements, perhaps because they are less intrusive than Status
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Updates, but they are strongly against seeing News Feed style content from users they
do not know. These results are consistent when control variables are included for being
exposed to mobilization messages by me through Facebook, gender, and ethnicity (see
Table 13).
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Table 12. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Favorability (without control variables)
Friends
Friends
Friends
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

(Perceived)

(Primed)

(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

5.08***
(0.19)

5.18***
(0.19)

5.08***
(0.19)

5.18***
(0.19)

Friends [see column header for variable]

0.02
(0.40)

-0.29
(0.38)

0.19
(0.40)

-0.29
(0.37)

Named Endorsement

-0.01
(0.27)

-0.05
(0.28)

0.02
(0.27)

-0.01
(0.28)

Named Endorsement X Friends

-0.21
(0.63)

0.08
(0.58)

-0.35
(0.62)

-0.04
(0.57)

Update

-1.37***
(0.26)

-1.60***
(0.28)

-1.37***
(0.27)

-1.60***
(0.28)

Update X Friends

0.27
(0.71)

1.15**
(0.60)

0.28
(0.69)

1.14**
(0.59)

525
0.07

522
0.08

525
0.07

522
0.08

N
R2

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
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Table 13. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Favorability (with control variables)
Friends
Friends
Friends
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

(Perceived)

(Primed)

(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

4.98***
(0.21)

5.10***
(0.21)

4.99***
(0.21)

5.10***
(0.21)

Friends [see column header for variable]

0.43
(0.49)

-0.24
(0.42)

0.39
(0.48)

-0.25
(0.41)

Named Endorsement

0.05
(0.27)

-0.02
(0.28)

0.08
(0.27)

0.02
(0.28)

Named Endorsement X Friends

-0.23
(0.63)

0.15
(0.58)

-0.35
(0.61)

0.04
(0.57)

Update

-1.36***
(0.27)

-1.59***
(0.28)

-1.36***
(0.27)

-1.59***
(0.28)

Update X Friends

0.31
(0.71)

1.16**
(0.60)

0.33
(0.69)

1.15**
(0.59)

Received Mobilization Messages

-0.40
(0.47)

-0.13
(0.43)

-0.34
(0.49)

-0.10
(0.44)

Male

0.06
(0.21)

0.04
(0.21)

0.06
(0.21)

0.04
(0.21)

Hispanic

0.46
(0.35)

0.45
(0.35)

0.46
(0.35)

0.46
(0.35)

524
0.08

521
0.08

524
0.08

521
0.08

N
R2

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
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The same pattern discovered for Favorability exists for Trustworthy. When the
definition of “Friends” is expanded to include those who believe they friended me
through Facebook but did not, those who are exposed to the Update and think they
friended me (UpdateXPerceived) evaluate the candidate as more Trustworthy (Table 14)
than those exposed to the same treatment who believe they did not friend me through
Facebook (Update). As with Favorability those respondents who believe they did not
friend me through Facebook exhibit a backlash effect, reporting that the candidate is
less Trustworthy. These results are consistent when control variables are included for
being exposed to mobilization messages by me through Facebook, gender, and ethnicity
(Table 15).
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Table 14. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Trustworthiness (without control variables)
Friends
Friends
Friends
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

(Perceived)

(Primed)

(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

5.01***
(0.18)

5.06***
(0.19)

5.01***
(0.18)

5.06***
(0.19)

Friends [see column header for variable]

-0.36
(0.39)

-0.45
(0.36)

-0.35
(0.38)

-0.44
(0.36)

Named Endorsement

-0.31
(0.27)

-0.22
(0.28)

-0.31
(0.28)

-0.22
(0.29)

Named Endorsement X Friends

0.78
(0.59)

0.26
(0.55)

0.76
(0.58)

0.26
(0.55)

Update

-1.28***
(0.26)

-1.49***
(0.27)

-1.29***
(0.26)

-1.50***
(0.27)

Update X Friends

0.51
(0.70)

1.24**
(0.58)

0.55
(0.68)

1.26**
(0.57)

534
0.05

334
0.06

534
0.05

531
0.06

N
R2

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

85

Table 15. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Trustworthiness (with control variables)
Friends
Friends
Friends
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

(Perceived)

(Primed)

(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

4.91***
(0.20)

4.96***
(0.23)

4.91***
(0.20)

4.96***
(0.21)

Friends [see column header for variable]

-0.29
(0.48)

-0.43
(0.41)

-0.25
(0.47)

-0.41
(0.40)

Named Endorsement

-0.24
(0.27)

-0.19
(0.29)

-0.24
(0.27)

-0.19
(0.29)

Named Endorsement X Friends

0.75
(0.59)

0.35
(0.52)

0.75
(0.58)

0.35
(0.54)

Update

-1.27***
(0.26)

-1.47***
(0.52)

-1.28***
(0.26)

-1.48***
(0.27)

Update X Friends

0.53
(0.71)

1.23**
(0.00)

0.58
(0.69)

1.26**
(0.57)

Received Mobilization Messages

-0.09
(0.46)

-0.02
(0.04)

-0.16
(0.48)

-0.06
(0.42)

Male

0.08
(0.20)

0.07
(0.96)

0.09
(0.20)

0.08
(0.20)

Hispanic

0.43
(0.35)

0.42
(0.73)

0.43
(0.35)

0.42
(0.35)

533
0.06

530
0.07

533
0.06

530
0.07

N
R2

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
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The same pattern discovered for Favorability and Trustworthy exists for Likelihood
to Support. When the definition of “Friends” is expanded to include those who believe
they friended me through Facebook but did not, those who are exposed to the Update
and think they friended me (UpdateXPerceived) report greater willingness to vote for the
endorsed candidate (Table 16) than those exposed to the same treatment who believe
they did not friend me through Facebook (Update). However, the base level of
willingness to support the endorsed candidate among respondents who saw just a
Facebook advertisement with no personalized endorsement is “Somewhat likely.”
While the magnitude of support among respondents who were exposed to the Update
and thought they friended me through Facebook (UpdateXPerceived) is larger than the
constant, this difference does not change the level of support for the endorsed
candidate. Respondents who were exposed to the Update and thought they friended me
through Facebook (UpdateXPerceived) are also only “Somewhat likely” to support the
endorsed candidate.
As with Favorability and Trustworthy, those respondents who believe they did not
friend me through Facebook exhibit a backlash effect, reporting lower levels on the
Likelihood to Support scale when exposed to the Update. Respondents who were exposed
to the Update and believed they did not friend me through Facebook (Update) report
being “Not very likely” to support the endorsed candidate.
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These results are generally consistent when control variables are included for
being exposed to mobilization messages by me through Facebook, gender, ethnicity,
and age (Table 17). Given that the candidate’s name is of Hispanic origin, it is not
surprising that Hispanics are more positive in their Likelihood to Support the candidate.
This behavior is consistent with the identity politics literature (see McDermott 2009).
.
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Table 16. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Likelihood to Support
(without control variables)
Friends
Friends
Friends
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

(Perceived)

(Primed)

(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

2.46***
(0.07)

2.48***
(0.07)

2.46***
(0.07)

2.47***
(0.07)

Friends [see column header for variable]

0.02
(0.17)

-0.05
(0.15)

0.04
(0.17)

-0.03
(0.15)

Named Endorsement

-0.07
(0.11)

-0.08
(0.11)

-0.06
(0.11)

-0.08
(0.12)

Named Endorsement X Friends

0.35
(0.25)

0.25
(0.23)

0.28
(0.25)

0.21
(0.22)

Update

-0.37***
(0.10)

-0.44***
(0.10)

-0.38***
(0.10)

-0.44***
(0.10)

Update X Friends

0.25
(0.28)

0.44*
(0.24)

0.24
(0.27)

0.44*
(0.24)

582
0.04

579
0.04

582
0.04

579
0.04

N
R2

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
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Table 17. Social Endorsement Experiment: OLS Regression of Candidate Likelihood to Support
(with control variables)
Friends
(Actual Who Recall)

Friends
(Perceived)

Friends
(Primed)

Friends
(Primed &
Perceived)

_cons

2.19***
(0.41)

2.18***
(0.41)

2.17***
(0.41)

2.18***
(0.41)

Friends [see column header for variable]

0.10
(0.21)

-0.10
(0.17)

0.13
(0.21)

-0.07
(0.17)

Named Endorsement

0.01
(0.11)

-0.04
(0.12)

0.02
(0.11)

-0.02
(0.12)

Named Endorsement X Friends

0.33
(0.27)

0.35
(0.24)

0.26
(0.27)

0.30
(0.24)

Update Treatment

-0.38***
(0.10)

-0.45***
(0.11)

-0.39***
(0.10)

-0.46***
(0.11)

Update X Friends

0.26
(0.30)

0.48*
(0.26)

0.26
(0.29)

0.47*
(0.26)

Received Mobilization Messages

-0.06
(0.21)

0.06
(0.18)

-0.10
(0.22)

0.04
(0.18)

Male

0.03
(0.09)

0.02
(0.09)

0.03
(0.09)

0.02
(0.09)

Hispanic

0.37***
(0.13)

0.37***
(0.13)

0.37***
(0.13)

0.37***
(0.13)

Age

0.01
(0.02)

0.01
(0.02)

0.01
(0.02)

0.01
(0.02)

515
0.07

518
0.06

515
0.07

N
518
R2
0.07
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.
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4.8 DISCUSSION
While the power of social media endorsements is extremely important to the
future of companies such as Facebook to make money, it is unclear to what extent they
work. The Update treatment shows that there may be potential for users to positively
influence each other through direct appeals (via the News Feed); but this method also
poses the greatest risk. The one consistent finding throughout this essay is that users
develop worse feelings for content when they are exposed to a Status Update
endorsement from someone with whom they do not have an existing relationship.
These feelings may be the result of user norms and not the content itself since the users
experiencing the greatest benefit from the Update were those who perceived that they
were friends with me through Facebook even though we were not. Social network sites,
such as Facebook, do not show users Status Updates from people they have not
friended, regardless of if they think they friended them or want to friend them.
Therefore, it is impossible for the circumstances in which the positive and backfire
effects were produced for this study could occur in the real world. Participants who
friended me through Facebook and remembered doing so exhibit tolerance for receiving
messages from me, but are unaffected by them.
That said, it is interestingly that participants who could correctly identify that
they friended me appear unaffected by my endorsements, even when the endorsements
include my name and photograph, but all those who thought they friended me exhibit a
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positive reaction. I suspect this is because participants who could correctly identify
whether or not they friended me are probably more attentive than participants who
thought they friended me but did not. Therefore, participants who could correctly
identify whether they friended me were persuaded by the content, but rather they were
able to give an appropriate response to seeing a message from a familiar person. Those
familiar with me accepted the endorsement, but ignored it, while those unfamiliar with
me were averse to seeing something they might equate to “spam.”
Respondents who thought they friended me but did not are more likely to accept
SNS cues than their more attentive counterparts. This might mean that less attentive
respondents are more persuadable and in need of cues. Interestingly, though, not all
SNS cues are created equal. Those who perceived that we were “friends” through
Facebook are no more responsive to the Named Endorsement than the No Endorsement. In
fact, the only endorsement appearing to produce any positive gain is a Status Update.
That said, none of the treatments were able to produce a meaningful positive
change on the Likelihood to Support measure. I suspect that the analysis presented here
does not detect a meaningful change in the Likelihood to Support measure because unlike
Favorability and Trustworthiness, Likelihood to Support forces the participant to assume
that they are going to vote and therefore must make a decision. It may be that
respondents would not rely on SNS cues to make such a decision, or perhaps exposure
to the candidate (even in the No Endorsement) is enough to produce an elevated baseline
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level of support for the candidate because the question text may imply to some
respondents that if they are “Not at all likely” to support the endorsed candidate then
they must have someone else in mind. To test this, one would need to evaluate
Likelihood to Support among those who have had been exposed to no materials regarding
the candidate and compare it to the No Endorsement treatment.
Based on the data provide by this experiment, it is unclear if social media
endorsements are actually useful for campaigns or democracy. Given the size of online
social networks it is reasonable to question if users would not still exhibit the backlash
effects discovered among people who were unfamiliar with me. Furthermore, research
shows that it is possible for SNSs help users create networks that are more diverse as
users connect with people they barely know (Lampe, Ellison, and Steinfield 2006). As
networks grow larger the policy preferences of one’s Facebook “friends” may not be an
accurate proxy for his or her own preferences which might increase the potential for
backlash effects. Issues of policy preference cohesion among online social networks
needs to be further explored to know if endorsements have no effect or a backlash effect
on users. If online social networks are found to be generally homogenous then the
preferences endorsed by a strong-tie could potentially provide a useful heuristic to his
or her entire network. However, if networks are more heterogeneous, it is important to
understand how the information received through an online social network is
processed and later accessed for decision-making and how users manage competing
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endorsements. Subsequently, these data show that users might just be mostly
unaffected by endorsements from their weak-ties. It would not be surprising to discover
that users modified their reaction to stimuli (like those presented for this study) based
on the closeness of their relationship with the endorser.
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5

CONCLUSIONS & CAUTIONS
The publication of studies examining social media for civic engagement is a

relatively new development in political science. A quick search for the keywords “social
network site,” “SNS,” and “Facebook” in the top political science journal, American
Political Science Review, returns zero results. The term “social media” returns only one
item; a “Notes From the Editor” published in 2011. The Note discusses the need for
vigorous scholarly debate and simply recognizes the “age of social media” (iii). The
term “Internet” produces just 112 articles. That said, niche journals such as the Journal of
Information Technology and Politics have developed to fill this void, and the discussion of
social media as a political phenomenon is now rapidly infiltrating the political science
literature. While there is a great deal of interesting work being done around social
media more broadly, it has been exclusively observational analysis or lab experiments
that focus on SNSs as a communication tool rather than a tool for political organizing
(see Boyd and Ellison 2007). Even work implicating social media as a catalyst for the
Arab Spring frames social media as a tool for mass communication to circumvent the
state controlled media rather than an interpersonal mobilization tool (Attia et al. 2011).
Contrasting the literature’s approach to SNSs as a tool for mass communication
and information gathering rather than organizing may appear to some readers as a
difference without distinction. However, current SNS research focuses on the people
producing content or searching for content as the unit of analysis rather than their
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networks. This is largely because SNSs do not easily allow for analysis of observers.
Only through the use of confederates can the effects of information presented on a SNS
be evaluated experimentally.
Moreover, there are incredible institutional challenges with studying SNSs. First,
the rules that govern these sites change frequently and are not conducive to reliable
data collection. In 2009, when I conducted the knowledge experiment that used two
profiles I had to get the explicit consent of two people to create profiles with their
likeness and administer these accounts during the experiment. The advent of the
“Friends List” feature allows researchers to conduct randomized experiments from a
single profile now; however, collecting data from Facebook is still incredibly
cumbersome. Facebook’s terms of service ask users not to collect users' content or
information using “automated means.” To not violate this policy I had to take
individual screen shots of my 2010 mobilization experiment participants’ profile pages
and hand enter the data contained on their pages. Moreover, you must explain to
participants how their information is being used. For academic researchers this is most
easily done through an Institutional Review Board’s Informed Consent document, but
non-academic researchers should be aware of Facebook’s policy against passive data
collection.
Second, the way SNSs present information to users is constantly changing. These
changes are rarely explained to users or even disclosed when they occur. Making sure
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the subjects are actually exposed to the information being posted is increasingly
difficult. In February 2012, Facebook announced that, “the average News Feed story
from a user profile reaches just 12 percent of their friends” (Constine 2012) That said,
Facebook revealed that it prioritizes content to make sure that shared links, photos, and
Status Updates reach more than just 12 percent of a user’s network; however, it is not
clear if or how Facebook prioritizes “priority” the people producing this content.
Although shared links, photos, and Status Updates are more likely to show up in
your friend’s News Feed than auto-generated content, it is unclear if some Status
Updates are more likely to appear than others. Does Facebook decide whether or not to
show an Update based on how many photos you and the poster are tagged in together?
Do they use a metric such as how many “Likes” the Update received from other users
before presenting it in your News Feed? These types of systematic prioritizing policies
make it increasingly difficult for researchers to conduct studies on Facebook. Aside
from concerns about participants logging onto the site during the study, the lack of
relationship between the researcher and the participants could mean that none of the
participants see the content posted by the researcher or worse that the participants
being presented with the content are somehow systematically different from other
participants. While random condition assignment should preserve the internal validity
of studies affected by such problems, being able to generalize findings to the larger
Facebook universe would be difficult.
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To address issues of exposure I offered participants an incentive that encouraged
them to both enroll in the study and access my Facebook profile regularly. The
incentive consisted of posting two final exam extra credit questions prior to the exam.
During the recruitment process, students were told that the questions would be posted
“at some point during the next few weeks,” but a specific date was not provided, nor
were students told that the questions would be posted after the election. It is important
to note that this incentive did not ensure participants read everything I posted, but it
was the most practical solution for the exposure issues.
Third, the rules that govern SNSs and the prioritization of information as well as
usage patterns make it difficult to replicate results. Even during the 12 month duration
of the work presented in this essay, the design for the experiment was altered to adapt
to platform changes. Although experimental methods show causality, it is necessary for
frequent and rigorous replication of studies to show generalizability of their findings.
Unfortunately, unless experiments occur simultaneously it is impossible to replicate
SNS experiments exactly. In addition to the methodological challenges of studying
SNSs, there are normative questions about how useful SNSs are for increasing political
knowledge, changing political attitudes, and activating civic behavior.
It is important that as we understand more about how users learn from each
other via SNSs that the companies offering these services think carefully about how
their filtering algorithms effect users in terms of political learning and coping with

98
information overload, cognitive discontinuity, and misinformation. A detrimental
function of the algorithms that determine which content to display to users is that those
users least interested in politics are increasingly missing political learning opportunities
as the algorithm filters out more and more of the political content that the user’s
network posts. For example, each member of a political campaign’s online social
network is linked to hundreds of other users who are waiting to be entertained,
educated, and persuaded. The ability for campaigns to get their message out by asking
their supporters to post on SNSs is limited by the sites’ willingness to ensure that even
the most disinterested user is exposed to such appeals. Conversely, it is conceivable that
a political campaign might want to mount a misinformation campaign directed at their
challenger. As the network diversity report by Facebook shows, such content can
spread far and fast because unlike traditional media, social media only censors
information based on how relevant it believes that information is to the user, not on the
quality of the information being communicated.
Moreover, the stimuli provided in the experiments included in this essay were
intended to be nonpartisan and noncontroversial. It is possible that a participant
disagreed or did not believe the information I presented; however, given the utilitarian
nature of most of the stimuli presented to participants, it is unlikely they had any
existing perceptions that exposure to my stimuli might have challenged. That said,
further investigation is necessary to understand how posted information affect users’
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ability to vote correctly. If online social networks are found to be generally homogenous
then the preferences endorsed by one member could provide a useful heuristic to his or
her entire network. However, if networks are more heterogeneous, it is important to
understand how the information received through online social networks is processed
and later accessed for decision-making and how users manage information that is
inconsistent with their own beliefs.
It is possible that SNSs could better encourage civic engagement by modifying
the content display algorithms to minimize misinformation and/or cognitive
discontinuity by exposing users to factually correct and consistent content. I suspect
Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of Facebook, would argue that the manipulation of
content exposure as I describe would be abhorrent given that users expect SNSs to offer
a space for open discourse with minimal censorship. Yet, traditional media engage in
this type of censorship via gatekeeping. Moreover, SNSs are already manipulating
which content users are exposed to but without regard for the political implications of
these decisions. More specifically, the findings presented in this essay indicate that
SNSs’ failure to consider the implications of their policies on their users’ ability to
engage in political learning will likely increase the political knowledge gap between
those who seek information and those who do not over the long-term.
Regardless of any platform changes that might be beneficial for the utopian ideal
of civic engagement, it remains to be seen if or how SNSs could be leveraged for
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meaningful electoral gain. While the power of SNSs to produce behavioral changes is
extremely important to the future of companies such as Facebook to make money, it is
unclear if this word-of-mouth advertising is actually useful for electoral campaigns. A
primary benefit of SNSs is that they provide a way to maintain relationships across
large geographic distances (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007). If this assumption is
true, and our online social networks are made up of people who span several cites,
congressional districts, and states how useful can such sites really be? Even at the
presidential level, any campaign strategist will say that a vote in Vermont or Utah is not
the same as a vote in Florida or Ohio. Therefore, even national elections are still heavily
restricted by geography. Because of this, it is unlikely that SNSs could ever be leveraged
in the same way as traditional canvassing, which can be targeted to rally geographic
areas that offer a candidate a tactical electoral advantage. That is not to say SNSs are
entirely useless. Research has shown that momentum is a crucial aspect in shaping
public opinion and winning elections (Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980; Bartels
1985). While unlikely to produce enough votes in a specific geographic area to swing an
election, SNSs might be able to increase the volume of material circulating about the
candidate and build momentum.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. KNOWLEDGE EXPERIMENT SURVEY
(RELEVANT QUESTIONS ONLY)
1. Do you have a Facebook profile?
¨ Yes
¨ No
2.

About how many Facebook friends do you have at Georgia State University or
elsewhere?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

None
1 – 10
11 – 50
51 – 100
101 – 150
151 – 200
201 – 250
251 – 300
301 – 350
351 – 400
More than 400

3. In the past week, approximately how many days have you logged into Facebook?
You may circle any number between 0 and 7.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Approximately, how many times per day have you logged into Facebook in the past
week? If you have not logged into the site at all please use “0” to indicate that.
__________ times per day
5. Thinking about the people you interact with on Facebook, on the whole, how
would you describe their interest in information about what’s going on in
government and politics?
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¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

Extremely interested
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Slightly interested
Not at all interested
I do not have a Facebook account

6. During a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family or
friends? Please exclude classroom discussions. You may circle any number between
0 and 7.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. Below are several questions that range in difficulty about entertainment and politics.
Please write-in your answers on the line provided for each question. If you are unsure
about the answer please check the “Not sure” box provided. Please provide an answer
to each question.
a.

Name one team in the 2009 World Series.
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

b.

If no candidate for mayor in Atlanta receives at least 50% plus 1 vote what
happens?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

c.

Did the Falcons win their last game?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

d.

Which star was eliminated from the television show “Dancing with the Stars”
Tuesday night?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure
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e.

Which college football team is currently ranked number 1?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

f.

Professors from which local university became involved in the most recent
Atlanta mayoral race?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

g.

Please name one organization that creates a nonpartisan voter guide?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

h.

Please name one candidate who ran in the most recent Atlanta mayoral election?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

i.

Which Atlanta musician was recently arrested?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

8. Below are several more questions that range in difficulty about entertainment and
politics. Please write-in your answers on the line provided for each question. If you are
unsure about the answer please check the “Not sure” box provided. Please provide an
answer to each question.
a.

During what hours are the polls open in Atlanta on any given Election Day?
___________AM - ___________PM
¨
Not sure

b.

Ellen DeGeneres will be a judge on which popular television show?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure
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c.

Which football team did the University of Georgia play this past Saturday?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

d.

Which former Atlanta Falcons player is now a quarterback for the Philadelphia
Eagles?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

e.

After 4 years of marriage what did Heidi Klum do?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

f.

Name one sport being added to the Olympics in 2016.
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

g.

h.

When was the last Atlanta mayoral election held?
Month: ___________________________ Day: ____________ Year: ____________
¨
Not sure
Which demographic group was reportedly likely to swing the most recent
Atlanta mayoral election?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

i.

Where was the current season of the television show “Survivor” filmed?
____________________________________________________________________
¨
Not sure

9. During the past week, how many days did you watch a local news program? You
may circle any number between 0 and 7.
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0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. How interested were you in the most recent Atlanta mayoral election?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

Extremely interested
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Slightly interested
Not at all interested

11. Are you…?
¨
¨

Male
Female

12. In what year were you born? Please enter your response as a four-digit number
(such as 1992).
___________
13. Do you consider yourself…?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

White
Black / African American
Hispanic
Asian or Pacific Islander
Native American or Alaskan Native
Mixed Race
Some other race
Decline to answer
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APPENDIX B. KNOWLEDGE EXPERIMENT QUESTION-BY-QUESTION RAW
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS CORRECTLY ANSWERING KNOWLEDGE
QUESTIONS SHOWN BY CONDITION

Political
Treatment

Entertainment
Treatment

Control

Which demographic group was reportedly likely to swing
the most recent Atlanta mayoral election?

0%

0%

0%

Please name one organization that creates a nonpartisan
voter guide.

2%

3%

2%

If no candidate for mayor in Atlanta receives at least 50%
plus 1 vote what happens?

49%

35%

36%

Professors from which local university became involved in
the most recent Atlanta mayoral election?

0%

0%

2%

Please name one candidate who ran in the most recent
Atlanta mayoral election.

40%

31%

32%

When was the last Atlanta mayoral election held?

24%

21%

17%

During what hours are the polls open in Atlanta on any
given Election Day?

24%

10%

16%

Name one sport being added to the Olympics in 2016.

16%

7%

7%

Ellen DeGeneres will be a judge on which popular
television show?

49%

45%

38%

Which former Atlanta Falcons player is now a quarterback
for the Philadelphia Eagles?

64%

44%

61%

Did the Falcons win their last game?

44%

38%

51%

Which Atlanta musician was recently arrested?

33%

30%

28%

Name one team in the 2009 World Series.

6-%

55%

63%

Which football team did the University of Georgia play
this past Saturday?

39%

36%

37%

Where was the current season of the television show
“Survivor filmed?

4%

4%

4%

After 4 years of marriage what did Heidi Klum do?

7%

13%

4%

Which college football team is currently ranked number 1?

22%

31%

35%

Which star was eliminated from the television show
“Dancing with the Stars” Tuesday night?

0%

0%

0%

Political Stimuli

Supplemental Stimuli

Entertainment Stimuli
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APPENDIX C. SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT SURVEY INSTRUMENT
(RELEVANT QUESTIONS ONLY)
FACEBOOK DEMOGRAPHICS
1.

About how many Facebook friends do you have at GSU or elsewhere?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

None
1 – 100
101 – 200
201 – 300
301 – 400
More than 400
POLITICAL EFFICACY

2.

How interested are you in information about what’s going on in government and politics?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

3.

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or
what?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

4.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Something else
Don’t know
Decline to answer

Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “strongly dislike” and 10 means “strongly like,” how do
you feel about the Democratic Party?
0

5.

Extremely interested
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Not very interested
Not at all interested

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “strongly dislike” and 10 means “strongly like,” how do
you feel about the Republican Party?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

FACEBOOK EXPERIMENT FOLLOW-UP

9

10

124

6.

Did you “friend” Holly Teresi, a Georgia State University graduate student, through Facebook to
receive questions for your final exam?
¨ Yes
¨ No

7.

IF YES TO Q6: Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you “know nothing about Holly Teresi”
and 10 means you are “good friends with her,” how would you rate your relationship?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

SOCIAL ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT
8.

RANDOM ASSIGNMENT: SEPARATE RESPONDENTS INTO THREE CONDITIONS: LIKE,
NAME, OR UPDATE.

9.

IF CONDITION ASSIGNMENT IN Q8 IS LIKE:

10.

125
11. IF CONDITION ASSIGNMENT IN Q8 IS NAME:

12. IF CONDITION ASSIGNMENT IN Q8 IS UPDATE:

13. PRESENT ON THE SAME SCREEN AS GRAPHIC: Please use the graphic above to rate Susana
Mendoza, a candidate for city clerk using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means she is “not at all
trustworthy” and 10 means she is “extremely trustworthy.”
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
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14. PRESENT ON THE SAME SCREEN AS GRAPHIC: Now, using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means
you are “not at all favorable” and 10 means you are “extremely favorable,” please rate your overall
impression of Susana Mendoza.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

15. PRESENT ON THE SAME SCREEN AS GRAPHIC: Finally, if the election were being held today,
how likely would you be to vote for Susana Mendoza for city clerk?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

Extremely likely
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Not very likely
Not at all likely
DEMOGRAPHICS

16. Are you…?
¨ Male
¨ Female
17. In what year were you born? Please enter your response as a four-digit number (such as 1992).
___________
18. Do you consider yourself…?
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨
¨

White
Black / African American
Hispanic
Asian or Pacific Islander
Native American or Alaskan Native
Mixed Race
Some other race
Decline to answer
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APPENDIX D. MOBILIZATION EXPERIMENT VOTER FILE MATCH EXAMPLES

Facebook Name*

Voter File Record

Number of
Records
Returned
by Search

Bob Jones
07/12/1987
Jane Smith
02/21/1989
Jacob Miller
07/12/1987

Name Challenges
Robert Jones
1
07/12/1987
Abigail Jane Smith
1
02/21/1989
Jacob Miller
3
07/12/1987

Robert Jones
07/12/1991
Bob Jones
07/12/1991
Jane Smith
02/21/1991
Jacob Miller
07/12/1991

Birth Year Challenges
Robert Jones
1
01/01/1991
Robert Jones
1
01/01/1991
Abigail Jane Smith
1
01/01/1991
Jacob Miller
3
01/01/1991

Considered Positive
Match

Yes
Yes
Not without further
evidence of address

Yes
Yes
Not without further
evidence of first name
Not without further
evidence of address

*The examples provided are not based on the identity of study participants.
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APPENDIX E. IRB APPROVAL: KNOWLEDGE EXPERIMENT (FRIENDING PHASE)
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science
Informed Consent
Title:
Principal Investigator:

Facebook Social Network Experiment
Jason Reifler
Holly Teresi

I.
Purpose: You are invited to take part in a research study. The purpose of this study is to learn
how Facebook impacts conversations and knowledge sharing. You are invited to take part because you
are enrolled in POLS 2401 and are at least 18 years old. A total of 200 people are needed for this study.
Enrollment in this study requires no more than 5 minutes of your time. You will need to enroll in this
study outside of class sometime during the next 7 days.
II.
Procedures: To take part in this study you must be at least 18 years old, have or create a
Facebook account, and “friend” the person named on the attached sheet via Facebook. For your
involvement in this study you will be told two extra credit questions for your final exam before the
exam. The questions will be posted as a “Status Update” by the person you “friend” for this study.
Your involvement in this study does not guarantee you will get credit for these questions. Failure to
answer the questions correctly may result in no extra credit. Only students who “friend” the person
named on their attached sheet will be able to find out the extra credit questions via www.facebook.com.
Students unable or unwilling to take part in the study may e-mail the researcher at
facebookprojects@yahoo.com to find out the extra credit questions.
III.
life.

Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of

IV.
Benefits: The benefit of your involvement includes the chance to help us learn about the impact
Facebook has on college students today.
V.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to
be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. Instructions for
dropping out of the study are on the attached sheet. If you do not wish to take part in this study or you
wish to drop out, you will need to e-mail the researcher at facebookprojects@yahoo.com to find out the
extra credit questions.
VI.
Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Dr. Jason Reifler
and Holly Teresi will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with
those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human
Research Protection (OHRP) and/or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the sponsor). We
will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be
stored on password and firewall protected computers. Your name and other facts that might point to you
will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and
reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.
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VIII.
Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Jason Reifler at jreifler@gsu.edu or Holly Teresi at
hteresi1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions about this study. If you have questions or concerns about
your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research
Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.
VIIII. Acknowledgement of Consent and Copy of Consent Form to Subject: If you agree to take part in
this study, please follow the instructions on the sheet attached. Please note that by “friending” the person
named in these instructions on Facebook you are consenting to taking part in this study. Please keep this
page as a copy of the consent you are providing for your records.
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APPENDIX F. IRB APPROVAL: KNOWLEDGE EXPERIMENT (SURVEY PHASE)
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science
Informed Consent
Title:
Principal Investigator:

Facebook Social Network Experiment
Jason Reifler
Holly Teresi

I.
Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this study is to learn
how talking about politics impacts people’s political behavior. You are invited to participate because you
are enrolled in POLS 2401 and are at least 18 years old. Participation in this study will take no more than
10 minutes of your time during class today.
II.

Procedures: To participate in this study you must finish the attached questionnaire.

III.
life.

Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of

IV.
Benefits: The benefit of your involvement includes the chance for you to talk about your
own experience with Facebook. Your input will also help us learn about the impact Facebook has
on political discussion.
V.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to
be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions
or stop answering questions at any time.
VI.
Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Dr. Jason Reifler
and Holly Teresi will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with
those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human
Research Protection (OHRP) and/or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the sponsor). We
will use a study number rather than your name on study records. The information you provide will be
stored on password and firewall protected computers. Your name and other facts that might point to you
will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and
reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.
VII. Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Jason Reifler at jreifler@gsu.edu or Holly Teresi at
hteresi1@student.gsu.edu if you have questions about this study. If you have questions or concerns about
your rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research
Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.
VIII.
Copy of Consent Form to Subject: Please tear off the back page of this survey to keep a copy of this
consent form.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign and print your name below.
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_________________________________________________________
Participant (Sign)

_________________
Date

_________________________________________________________
Participant (Print)

_________________________________________________________
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

__________________
Date
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APPENDIX G. IRB APPROVAL: SOCIAL ENDORSEMENTS SURVEY EXPERIMENT
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science
Informed Consent
Title: Dispositional Factors In Understanding Competitive Political Messages
Principal Investigator: Jason Reifler, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Georgia
State University, 38 Peachtree Center Ave. Suite 1005, Atlanta, GA, USA 30303-2514
Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate
how citizens make sense of political information that they receive. You were invited to participate
because you are a student in POLS 1101. Around 1000 participants will be recruited for this study.
Participation will require 1-2 hours of your time.
Procedures: If you decide to participate, you will answer about questions on your political beliefs, may
read some news articles or transcripts, and describe some basic information about yourself. This research
will be done totally online, and you will receive 3 points extra credit to be applied to your course grade.
Your answers will be completely confidential. You will interact with no one else.
Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. It is
important to know that some of the questions in this survey ask about contemporary political issues, and
that participants may feel discomfort about some of the topics they will be asked about.
Benefits: Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain
information to understand more about how people make sense of the information they receive about
politics. If you have not participated in a political science study before, this is a good opportunity to
experience first hand how political science research is conducted.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in
this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any
time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose
any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The survey will ask you
for some identifying information in order to be able to award the extra credit. Once the extra credit is
awarded, all personally identifying information will be deleted from all computer files and web servers.
Only Dr. Jason Reifler will have access to the information you provide. Your name and other facts that
might point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be
summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.
Contact Persons: Call Dr. Jason Reifler at 404-413-6176 (poljar@langate.gsu.edu) if you have questions
about this study. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research
study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or
svogtner1@gsu.edu.
Copy of Consent Form to Subject: Please print a copy of this consent form for your records.

133

This study has been approved by the Georgia State Institutional Review Board for the Protection\nof
Human Subjects.
Clicking "Yes" below indicates that you agree to participate in the study.
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APPENDIX H. IRB APPROVAL: MOBILIZATION FIELD EXPERIMENT
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science
Informed Consent
Title:
Principal Investigator:

The Facebook Social Network Project
Holly Teresi
Jason Reifler

I.
Purpose: You are invited to join a research study. The purpose of the study is to understand to
study the link between social networking sites and politics. You are being asked to join this study because
are at least 18 years of age. A total of 600 people will be part of this study. Involvement in this study will
require no more than 5 minutes of your time.
II.
Procedures: To join this study you must “friend” Holly Teresi
(http://www.facebook.com/holly.teresi) on Facebook and include a message with your birthday
(MM/DD/YY), instructor’s name (Jones), and class time (MW 11-12:15). For your participation in
this study you will be given access to two exam questions in advance of the final exam which will
be posted by the researcher via the "Status Update" function on Facebook. The questions will
remain posted on the researcher's page through the end of the semester. Students not
participating or who terminated their “friendship” with the researcher before the questions are
posted may e-mail the researcher at hteresi1@student.gsu.edu for the extra credit questions. The
researcher will provide the questions via e-mail at the same time she posts them on Facebook. As
a participant of this study you may receive messages from the researcher through Facebook
functions including the researcher’s Status Updates (presented to you on your News Feed) or
posts and comments made directly to your Facebook wall. The researcher may also use your name
and/or the information you provide by enrolling in the study to match public records, such as
electoral participation, to study participants.
III.

Risks: In this study, you will have no more risks than you would in a normal day of life.

IV.
Benefits: Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to
gain information to understand more about how people make sense of the information they receive
on social networking sites. If you have not participated in a research project before, this is a good
opportunity to experience first hand how academic research is conducted.
V.
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Joining this study is voluntary. You do not have to be
in this study. If you decide to be in this study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at
any time by “unfriending” Holly.
VI.
Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Holly Teresi and
her faculty advisor, Dr. Jason Reifler, will have access to the information you provide. Information may
also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the
Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP), and the sponsor). We will use a respondent number
rather than your name on study records with a key stored separately. The information you provide will be
stored on a password and firewall-protected computer. Your name and other facts that might point to you
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will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and
reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.
VII. Contact Persons: Contact Holly Teresi at hteresi1@student.gsu.edu or Dr. Jason Reifler at
jreifler@gsu.edu if you have questions about this study. Contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research
Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you have questions or concerns about your rights as a
participant in this research study.
VIII.

Copy of Consent Form to Subject: Please keep this consent form for your records.

